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DAMAGES TO DETER POLICE SHOOTINGS
W. Kip Viscusi*
Scott Jeffrey**

Many fatal shootings by police are not warranted. These shootings
impose losses on the victims and their families and reflect the failure of

existing administrative and legal restraints to deter these unwarranted
shootings. This Article proposes a revamping of existing incentives to both
provide more adequate compensation to the victims'families and to estab-

lish levels ofdeterrence that are sufficient to curtailunjustfatalities. There
are legal criteriafor what level offorce is "reasonable,"but determining

reasonablenessin practice may be difficult. Practicalguidancesuch as the
"21-foot rule" for the threat to warrant a shooting is often problematic.
The extent to which there is a problem of wrongful deaths resultingfrom
police shootings is difficult to ascertain based on governmentalstatistics,
which understate the total level of these killings. The Washington Post's
FatalForce dataset of on-duty fatalpolice shootings seeks to rectfy this
informationalgap, providing a list of almost 1,000fatal police shootings
annually since 2015. This inventory also providesfactsfrom public reports

of the shootings, including how the shooting conforms to pertinent legal
criteria of whether the victim was armed or fleeing the scene. Even if the
police shooting was not warranted, there may be both legal andpractical
barriersto obtainingcompensationfor the victim's estatefrom the municipality. Some of the relatively high-profile cases have received compensa-

tion in line with compensation levels in wrongful death cases generally. But
exceptfor some very rareexceptions, the compensation amount in wrongful

police shooting cases is well below the value that the government places on
reducing mortality risks through government regulations. As a result, the

compensation falls short of the levels needed to provide adequate deterrence to reduce these killings. To provide sufficient incentives, this Article
proposes that the total level of damagesforpolice shootings be consistent
with the value of a statisticallife used by government agencies when monetizing mortality risk reductionsfor government regulations. This value is
now in the $10 million range per expected fatality. Such amounts are too
high from the standpoint of setting conventional compensatory damages
*
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** Vanderbilt Law School, Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics. scott.b.jeffrey@vanderbilt.edu.
The authors would like to thank the University offlinois Law Review for their careful and thoughtful improvements to this Article.

741

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

742

[Vol. 2021

levels, but they provide a pertinentreferencepointfor settingpunitive damages and the total level of damages needed to establish appropriatelevels
of deterrence. The proposed triggerfor such award levels is when the officer has displayed a callous disregardfor the rights of others or if other
punitive damages criteriaare met. In the absence of such punitive damage
awards, monetizing the expected risks that can be prevented through improved policepractices can be accomplishedby using the value of a statistical life to guide police practices. Unlike the current low level of settlements andawardsfor police shootings, this approachprovides appropriate

guidance to municipalities to monetize fatality risks and to undertake benefit-cost analyses of policies to reduce unreasonable police shootings.
There have been recent callsfor more benefit-cost analyses ofpolicing, including the use offorce, although calculating the costs to the victims from
police use offorce have served as a barrierto such analyses. This Article
overcomes this barrierby using the value of a statisticallife as an empirically validated measure of the most direct cost offatal use offorce. This
approachprovides the basisfor calculatingthe first monetized estimate of
the cost ofpolice shootings. Further, this Article calculates the aggregate
monetized value for the loss of life from all police shootingsfrom 2015 to
2018, which totals $39.3 billion. If the shootings are restricted to those in
which the victim was either unarmed or fleeing, the total mortality cost totals $12.1 billion. Of this amount, the total mortality cost is $2.55 billion
for all unarmed victims, and $1.14 for victims who were both fleeing and
unarmed. Disincentivizing these shootings is a critical step for courts to
deterpolice shootings and promote effective policing.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Damages awards and out-of-court settlements after police shootings have a
twofold purpose. These payouts serve both to compensate the victims and to provide financial incentives to deter such police shootings in the future.' This Article
examines the prevalence of such fatal police shootings, 2 the preponderance of
black males among the victims of these shootings, and the level of compensation
that the families of these victims receive. There is substantial variability in the
treatment of these incidents, as some deaths are accorded very low compensation
amounts, while others receive compensation more in line with typical wrongful
death awards. 3 More important from the standpoint of providing financial incentives for deterrence is that the level of these financial sanctions almost invariably
is below the financial amount that the government believes is appropriate to
spend to reduce mortality risks through government regulations. The current
level of such values assigned to each expected death averted by government regulations is about $10 million, which this Article uses as the financial reference
point for the appropriate level of damages to deter fatalities from police shootings. 5 We will refer to this value as the "optimal deterrence amount." 6
This Article proposes that the current financial incentives shortfall be rectified and that payouts be aligned with how the federal government monetizes
expected fatalities that are prevented by government policies. 7 The courts should
award damages that establish effective deterrence levels to establish incentives
1. Eleanor Lumsden, How Much Is Police Brutality Costing America?, 40 U. HAw. L. REv. 142, 160
(2017); Rashawn Ray, How Can We Enhance Police Accountability in the United States, BRoOKINGS (Aug. 25,
https://www.brookings.edu/policy202O/votervital/how-can-we-enhance-police-accountability-in-the2020),
united-states/ [https://perma.cc/V6F7-RQFR].
2. We refer to incidents where on-duty police officers or deputy sheriffs shoot and kill someone as a "fatal
police shooting," or a "fatal shooting by police." Fatal police shootings do not refer to incidents where police
officers are fatally shot.
3. See, e.g., Ray, supra note 1 (discussing large settlements paid by major U.S. cities for police misconduct cases); Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, $16 Million vs. $4: In Fatal Police Shootings, Payouts Vary

Widely. N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/police-shootings-payouts.html
[https://perma.cc/8NHQ-RMLA] (contrasting between payout sizes and noting wide disparities).
4.
w. KIP viSCUSI, PRICING LIVES: GUIDEPOSTS FOR A SAFER SOCIETY 23-45 (2018).
5. Id. at 28; see also W. Kip viscusi & Joseph E. Adley, The Value ofa StatisticalLife: A Critical Review
of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 23 (2003).
6. See vISCUSI, supra note 4, at 18, 199-204.

7.

Infra Part VI.
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to avert such killings in situations in which the behavior by the police is malicious, reckless, or displays a callous disregard for the well-being of the deceased.8 While many potential police reforms are available for legislators to enact, this Article suggests a role for the judiciary to encourage local governments
to adopt the most effective reforms while providing more adequate compensation
to families of victims.9
The highly variable and usually inadequate payouts after wrongful killings
by police are exemplified by the following examples. For both settlements and
court awards, the financial sanctions for wrongful killings fall short of the optimal deterrence amount except in rare instances of very prominent deaths. 10 We
consider first two cases involving out-of-court settlements, and then address two
cases that led to trial verdicts.' To the extent that the financial awards have generated adequate incentives to deter future police killings, it is largely because of
idiosyncratic aspects of cases in which the publicity they generated led to public
outrage that fostered large payments, as opposed to any distinctive nature of that
particular homicide.1 2
A best-case scenario for disincentivizing police after such killings is that of
an Australian woman killed in Minneapolis after she summoned the police for a
neighborhood disturbance. On the night of July 15, 2017, Justine Damond' 3was
home alone since her fianc6 was traveling. She called 9-1-1 twice in eight
minutes to report a possible assault in the alley behind her residence. 14 Two Minneapolis Police Department officers responded to the calls, investigated the
claim, and cleared the area as safe after finding no suspects or signs of an assault.' 5 As Officers Noor and Harrity prepared to leave, they drove through an

alley with their vehicle's lights turned off.1 6 Both officers claim that they heard
a loud sound, and that immediately afterward, Ms. Damond appeared at the
18
driver's side window.1 7 Both officers reached for their guns in response. Officer Harrity initially struggled to remove his gun from his holster and did not
fire; however, Officer Noor, sitting in the passenger's seat, reached one arm
across the chest of his partner to make space for his other arm to point his gun at
8. Infra Part VI.
9. See infra Part V.
10. See generally infra Part IV.
11. Infra text accompanying notes 13-53, 68-92.
12. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 33-37.
13. Jared Goyette & Austl. Associated Press, Australian Justine Damond Shot Dead by US Police in Minneapolis, GUARDIAN (July 16, 2017, 8:37 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/jul/17/australianwoman-justine-damond-shot-dead-by-us-police-in-minneapolis [https://perma.cc/HM62-S7T4].
14. Mitch Smith, A 911 Call, an Unarmed Woman and a Single Shot: The Mystery of a Police Shooting,

N.Y. TImEs (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/13/us/mohamed-noor-trial-minneapolis.html
[https://perma.cc/T5wQ-MFL2].
15. Id.

16.
17.

Id

See id.
Tasneem Nashrulla, A Former Minnesota Cop Dramatically Testified About the Moment He Shot and
Killed an Unarmed Australian Woman, BUzzFEED NEWS (Apr. 26, 2019, 1:47 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.
com/article/tasneemnashrulla/mohamed-noor-testimony-murder-trial-minnesota-australia [https://perma.cc/9Y
YK-H3 WE].

18.
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Ms. Damond. 19 Officer Noor fired once through the driver's side open window,
striking Ms. Damond in the chest.20 She died twenty minutes later. 1
There is no audio or video of the shooting, as the officers both had their
body cameras switched off.22 However, it is undisputed that Ms. Damond was
unarmed, and Officer Noor testified that he did not see her hands or any object
in her hands, although he still believed his partner feared for his life and that his
partner viewed Ms. Damond as a threat. 23 During trial, a prosecutor asked Officer
Noor, "So her whole ... her whole blonde hair, pink T-shirt, and all, that was a
threat to you?" 24
Officer Noor replied, "That's how ... I relied on my training." 25
The killing generated substantial adverse international publicity for Minneapolis and for the United States generally.2 6 Within a week of the killing, the
Chief of Police resigned at the Mayor's request. 27 Mayor Betsy Hodges was
voted out of office later that year, in part due to outcry over this shooting. Later,
the city of Minneapolis agreed to a $20 million settlement with the victim's family.29 Officer Noor, a Somali-American, resigned from the police force upon being criminally charged. 30 On April 30, 2019, Noor was convicted of third-degree

19.

Id.

20. Smith, supra note 14.
21. Justine Damond Shooting: A Timeline of the Night, STAR TRts. (May 1, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://
www.startribune.com/justine-damond-a-timeline/477443943/ [https://perma.cc/3S44-29NY].
22. Saphora Smith, Australian Woman Shot Deadby MinneapolisPolice Officer After Calling911 Herself;
NBC NEWS (July 17, 2017, 6:10 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/australian-woman-shot-dead-

minneapolis-police-officers-after-calling-911-n783581_[https://perma.cc/RNT7-KXGQ].
23.

Nashrulla, supra note 18.

24.
25.

Id.
Id.

26. E.g., Australian Woman Justine Damond Killed in Police Shooting in Minneapolis, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (July 17, 2017, 12:45 PM), https://www.smh.com.au/world/australian-woman-killed-in-police-shooting-in-minneapolis-reports-20170717-gxchas.html [https://perma.cc/E9YL-7FJY]; Goyette & Austl. Associated
Press, supra note 13.
27. Mitch Smith, Minneapolis Police ChiefForced Out After FatalShooting of Australian Woman, N.Y.
TIMES (July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/21/us/minneapolis-police-chief-resigns-days-after-officer-fatally-shot-a-woman.html[https://perma.cc/2P3M-w73J].
28. Erin Golden, In Mayor Betsy Hodges' Re-Election Loss, Minneapolis Voters Were 'Lookingfor Something Different,' STAR TRiB. (Nov. 11, 2017, 3:17 PM), http://www.startribune.com/in-mayor-betsy-hodges-re[https://perma.cc/3GDFelection-loss-minneapolis-voters-were-looking-for-something-different/456732693/
LEJR].
29. Andy Mannix, Minneapolis Agrees to Pay $20 Million in Death of Justine Ruszczyk Damond, STAR
TiB. (May 4, 2019, 2:35 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-agrees-to-pay-20-million-in-fatal-police-shooting-of-justine-ruszczyk-damond/509438812/[https://perma.cc/VG5M-RT4X].
30. Libor Jany, Minneapolis Police Officer Mohamed Noor Turns Himself in on Murder, Manslaughter
Charges in JustineDamondKilling, STAR TRIB. (Mar. 21, 2018, 12:55 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minne-

apolis-police-officer-mohamed-noor-tums-himself-in-on-charges-in-justine-damond-killing/477405923/
[https://perma.cc/PN8T-TK46].
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murder and second-degree manslaughter.31 The charges brought a sentence of
12.5 years in prison.
The financial and criminal sanctions were unusually high relative to other
such police shootings.3 3 While the publicity and the public outrage regarding the
killing was unusual, the circumstances of the Justine Damond incident were not
markedly different from other police killings. 34 Other victims have also been unarmed and were killed without posing a fatal threat to the police.35 But the fact
that the victim was a white female, rather than a black male, and that the officer
was a black Muslim immigrant, are distinctive among other police shootings. 36
These differences were highlighted by many commentators as driving the disparity in the financial payout and an officer conviction between the shooting of
Damond and other fatal police shootings. 37
The extent of the variability in the sanctions imposed by out-of-court settlement amounts is exemplified by considering another incident in Minnesota.
On July 6, 2016, Philando Castile, a black male school cafeteria worker, was
pulled over for a traffic stop by a St. Anthony, Minnesota, police officer. 38 The
Officer Yanez pulled over the car-containing Castile, his fiancee, and their
four-year-old daughter-after he radioed to another officer that "[t]he two occupants just look like people that were involved in a robbery." 39 Officer Yanez
positioned himself at the driver's side window, explaining to Castile that he was
pulled over because of a brake light issue, while his backup, Officer Kauser, approached the passenger's window.4 0 Officer Yanez asked for identification and

31. Mitch Smith, Minneapolis Police Officer Convicted ofMurder in Shooting ofAustralian Woman, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/us/minneapolis-police-noor-verdict.html [https://

perma.cc/2CML-KMVN].
32.

Matt Furber & Mitch Smith, Somali-American Police Officer Sentenced to 12.5 Years in Death of

Minneapolis Woman, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/us/minneapolis-policesentencing-mohamed-noor.html [https://perma.cc/U3HR-BCVMI].

See id
John Eligon, A Black Officer, a White Woman, a Rare Murder Conviction. Is It 'Hypocrisy' orJustice?,
N.Y. TIMEs (May 3, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/03/us/mohamed-noor-guilty.html [https://perma.
cc/7MN4-T5NE].
33.
34.

35. E.g., Timothy Williams & Mitch Smith, $16 Million vs. $4: In Fatal Police Shootings, Payouts Vary
Widely, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/us/police-shootings-payouts.html

[https://perma.cc/6YYWL-URWT].
Eligon, supra note 34.
See id; Mannix, supra note 29; Joey Jackson, Opinion, Mohamed Noor's Sentence Raises Uncomfortable Questions About Race, CNN (June 8, 2019, 9:07 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/03/opinions/mo[https://perma.cc/KXS7hamed-noor-conviction-justine-ruszczyk-death-raises-questions-jackson/index.html
36.
37.

QL7U].
38. See Melissa Chan, Philando Castile Was a Role Model to Hundreds of Kids, Colleagues Say, TIME
(July 7, 2019, 2:47 PM), https://time.com/4397086/minnesota-shooting-philando-castile-role-model-school/
[https://perma.cc/PK9W-9Y8K] (discussing the life and death of Mr. Castile).
39. Andy Mannix, Police Audio: Officer Stopped Philando Castile on Robbery Suspicion, STAR TRIB.
(July 12, 2016, 7:55 PM), http://www.startribune.com/police-audio-officer-stopped-philando-castile-on-rob-

bery-suspicion/386344001/#1 [http://perma.cc/T8LZ-SERS].
40. See, e.g., id.; Alex Johnson, Minnesota Officers in Fatal Shooting ofPhilandoCastile Identified, NBC
NEWS (July 7, 2016, 10:44 PM), https://www.nbenews.com/news/us-news/minnesota-officers-fatal-shooting-

philando-castile-identified-n605701 [https://perma.cc/TW63-6D3D].
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proof of insurance, which Castile provided. 41 A few seconds later, Castile calmly
stated to Officer Yanez, "Sir, I have to tell you that I do have a firearm on me.'
Officer Yanez interrupted Castile to say, "OK," and put his hand on his gun before telling Castile, "[D]on't reach for it, then . .. don't pull it out."4 3 Castile and
his fiancee both assured the officer that Castile was not reaching for the gun.44
Officer Yanez began to raise his voice as he issued the same command, reaching
his left hand into the vehicle, and with his right hand pulling his own gun out of
his holster.4 5 Officer Yanez then fired seven shots into the vehicle, five of which
struck Castile. 46
Dash cam footage from Officer Yanez's car shows that just twelve seconds
elapsed from the moment Castile informed Officer Yanez that he had a gun to
the moment of the shooting. 47 In addition to the dash cam footage that captured
the shooting, Castile's fiancee started a Facebook Live video immediately after
the shooting that received over 2.5 million views in under 24 hours.4 8
All of the added attention to this fatal shooting did not result in an inflated
payout or a conviction.4 9 The family of Philando Castile settled with the city for
just under $3 million, while Officer Yanez was acquitted of second-degree manslaughter charges. 50
Both deaths were unnecessary, at the hands of police officers in Minnesota,
settled by the families of the decedents with their respective cities, but resulted
in vastly different outcomes. The family of Justine Damond received $20 million, while the family of Philando Castile received $3 million.5 1 The officer who
killed Ms. Damond was sentenced to 12.5 ears in prison;52 the officer who killed
Mr. Castile was acquitted of all charges. 5
When prominent police shootings result in a payout to the family of the
victim, that compensation usually occurs via settlement rather than after a jury
41.

Matt DeLong & Dave Braunger, BreakingDown the Dashcam: The PhilandoCastile Shooting Time-

line, STAR TRIB. (June 21, 2017, 10:48 AM), https://www.startribune.com/castile-shooting-timeline/429678313/
[https://perma.cc/5E96-CM2T].

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id.

46. Associated Press, PoliceOficer Who Shot Philando Castile 'DidWhat He Hadto Do, 'Lawyer Claims,
GUARDIAN (June 12, 2017, 5:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/un/12/philando-castileshooting-jeronimo-yanez-trial [https://perma.cc/V7E9-2UX9].
47. DeLong & Braunger, supra note 41.
48. Andrea Peterson, Why the Philando Castile Police-Shooting Video Disappearedfrom Facebook-Then Came Back, WASH. POST (July 7, 2016, 11:53 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch
/wp/2016/07/07/why-facebook-took-down-the-philando-castile-shooting-video-then-put-it-back-up/
[https://

perma.cc/T9SR-JH8K].
49.

Compare Mannix, supra note 29 (noting Minneapolis agreed to a $20 million payout to Ms. Damond's

family), with Mitch Smith, Philando CastileFamily Reaches $3Million Settlement, N.Y. TMES (June 26, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/N9Vwhttps://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/26/us/philando-castile-family-settlement.html
38LQ] (noting Philando Castile's family received a mere $3 million payout).
50. See Smith, supra note 49.
51. Compare Mannix, supra note 29, with Smith, supra note 49.
52. Furber & Smith, supra note at 32.
53. Smith, supra note 49.
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verdict. 54 This emphasis on out-of-court settlements is consistent with tort liability cases generally." The criteria applied in litigation are nevertheless relevant
in that they define the expectations of the parties regarding the plaintiff's prospects of success and the likely award. 56 These expectations in turn affect how
much the plaintiffs require to settle the case and what the defendants are willing
to offer to resolve the case. 57
Some of the pertinent criteria applied by the courts for police shootings are
specific to the particular context and the legal discretion that police officers have
to fire their weapons. 58 When families in these prominent cases do take police to
court for wrongful death claims, the prosecution must first convince the jury that
it was unreasonable that the police officer shot his 5 9 gn 60 This Article explores
some of the criteria of what is unreasonable below. 6' If the jury finds the police
liable, any award that the jury hands down must survive the judge's discretion,
including the reversal of decisions due to considerations including: the judge's
belief that the award is excessive, 62 special interrogatories that use the words of
the jury against their own wishes, 63 the judge's interpretation of qualified immunity, 64 and a lack of proof that the decedent survived long enough after the
65
gunshot to warrant any pain and suffering damages. Court payouts for fatal
police shootings have been overturned at least as far as ten years removed from

54. See, e.g., id. (noting Ms. Damond's $20 million award came through settlement); see also Lauren
Hodges, Cleveland to Pay $6 Million to Settle Tamir Rice Suit, NPR (Apr. 25, 2016, 11:26 AM), https://
www. npr. org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/04/25/475 583 746/cleveland-to-pay-6-mil lion-to-settle-tamir-rice-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/RvZ7-2NBX] (discussing Cleveland's $6 million settlement to Tamir Rice's family); Nicole Chavez & Christina Carrega, Breona Taylor Settlement Is Among Largest PayoutsLinked to a Police Shooting, CNN (Sept. 16, 2020, 5:59 PM), https://www.cbs58.com/news/breonna-taylor-settlement-is-among-largestpayouts-linked-to-a-police-shooting [https://perma.cc/4BT8-VR4P] (noting Louisville reached a $12 million settlement with Breona Taylor's family].
55. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 805 (2011)
(assessing settlement mill law firms as a method of tort reform because they speed up settlements).
56. See Jonah Newman, Chicago Police Use 'Cover Charges' to Justify Excessive Force, CHI. REP.
(Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/chicago-police-use-cover-charges-to-justify-excessive-force/

[https://perma.cc/2BGH-XVYS).
57.

See id.

58.

Id.

59.

In these cases, it is rarely a female police officer who shoots and kills someone. See Philip Matthew

Stinson, The Henry A. Wallace Police Crime Database, BOWLING GREEN ST. U., https://policecrime.bgsu.edu
(last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/R33R-SXDZ] (database that contains 9,819 nonfederal law enforcement officers charged with a crime over 2005-2015).
60. See Andrew Chung et al., For Cops Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS (May 8,
2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-police-immunity-scotus/ [https://

perma.cc/4KLZ-ZZJG].

v.

61.

See discussion infra Parts II,

62.

See Ferguson v. City of New York, 73 A.D.3d 649, 650-51 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
See Dan Hinkel, Conflicting Verdict Favors Chicago Cop in FatalShooting as Trial Ends in Confu-

63.
sion, CHI. TRIB. (June 28, 2018, 5:45 AM), httpsJ/www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-quintonio-

legrier-police-shooting-trial-20180628-story.html [https://perma.cc/5vQ8-5PTB].
64. Julia Jacobs, Judge Rescinds $38 Million Award to Family of Maryland Woman Shot by Police, N.Y.
[https://
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/16/us/korryn-gaines-shooting-verdict.html

perma.cc/3HTW-VFER].
65. See Ferguson, 73 A.D.3d at 649-50.
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the shooting. 66 Finally, the award will potentially face appeals from the city responsible for paying it, before the city will agree to disperse the award.67
The following two examples address two prominent fatal police shootings
that resulted in payouts not via settlement but by jury verdict. While the original
compensatory jury verdicts were vastly different, the two cases are tied together
through two similarities in that the victims were black and both awards were
overturned by judges.
On January 14, 2014, St. Lucie County sheriff's deputy Christopher Newman responded to a noise complaint.68 He and another deputy arrived at the home
of Gregory Hill, a thirty-year-old black father of three, who was playing music
in his garage with the door closed. 69 The two deputies knocked on the garage
door, and Mr. Hill raised the garage door. 70 After seeing it was the police, Mr.
Hill, intoxicated at the time, lowered the garage door back down.71 Deputy Newman then fired through the door four times, striking Mr. Hill twice in the abdomen and once in the head. 72 The incident took less than two minutes. 73 Four
hours later, the police and a SWAT team entered the garage and found Mr. Hill
dead. 74 The deputies claim Mr. Hill was holding an unloaded handgun at the
time, although this fact is disputed since it was found in his back pocket when
the officers entered the garage. 75
Mr. Hill's mother filed a wrongful death lawsuit 76 and in 2018, a jury
awarded $4 to Mr. Hill's family. 77 Specifically, the award was $1 for funeral
expenses, and $1 for each of Mr. Hill's three children. 78 The award was so small
partly because the jury found that Mr. Hill was mostly responsible for his own
death.79 Furthermore, the jurors were asked to compare the negligence of each
party for Mr. Hill's death, and since the jurors decided that the deputies were
only 1% at fault for Mr. Hill's death, the $4 award was reduced to four cents.8 0
This award was later reduced to nothing.8

66.
67.
68.

See id
See generally id.
P.R. Lockhart, A Black Man Was Fatally Shot by Law Enforcement. A Federal Jury Gave His Family

$4, vox (May 31, 2018, 6:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/5/31/17414344/gregory-vaughn-hilljr-police-shooting-florida-4-dollar-settlement [https://perma.cc/6SJW-6BR3].

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id
Id
Id
Id

73. Matt Stevens, Jury Leaves $4 to Family ofMan Killed by Sheriff's Deputy, Along with Many Questions,
N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/us/gregory-hill-verdict-florida.htm [https://

perma.cc/Y94A-LWE8].
74.
75.
76.
77.

Lockhart, supra note 68.
Stevens, supra note 73.
Lockhart, supra note 68.
Id.

78.
79.
80.
81.

Id
Id.
Id

Id
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On August 1, 2016, three officers from the Baltimore County Police Department arrived at the home of twenty-three-year-old Korryn Gaines to serve
her an arrest warrant for a traffic violation. 82 After knocking and receiving no
response, the officers got a key from the landlord and entered Ms. Gaines' apartment and found Ms. Gaines sitting on the floor and pointing a gun at the officers. 83 The officers fled and tried negotiating with her, but police say Ms. Gaines
84
repeatedly refused to surrender during the six-hour standoff. While the involved officers were not wearing body cameras, Ms. Gaines began recording
85
parts of the standoff and posting her videos to Instagram.
Police report that eventually Ms. Gaines threatened the officers and aimed
a shotgun at them. 86 The officers then shot and killed Ms. Gaines and injured her
five-year-old son. 87 The family of Ms. Gaines filed a wrongful death lawsuit in
2016, and the jury found that the first shot fired by the officers was not reasonable
and thus violated her and her son's civil rights.8 The family received $38.2 million in compensatory damages from the jury, though only $300,000 of which was
for the estate of Ms. Gaines. 89 A judge later overruled that jury award, however,
finding that the officer had qualified immunity and thus was protected from civil
liability. 90 The judge removed all parts of the award, including the $7,000 for
92
funeral expenses.9 1 The family stated they will appeal this decision.
93
These four examples are not rare outliers. Police shootings have been frequent and provided much of the impetus for the emergence of the Black Lives
Matter movement in 2013.94 This Article examines the dimensions of the problem, the considerations that govern whether damages payments are awarded, and
the level of such payments. Part II examines the specific legal criteria for when
the police are authorized to shoot people. Three major U.S. Supreme Court cases
82.

Jamiles Lartey, Black Woman Shot Dead by Police During Alleged Standoff While Holding Son,

GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2016, 11:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/aug/02/korryn-gaines-black-

woman-killed-by-police-son-injured [https://perma.cc/i938-4K2F].
83. Id
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id
87. Rosalie Chan, BaltimorePolice Confirm Korryn Gaines'Son Was Shot by Officer, TIME (Aug. 5, 2016,
[https://perma.cc/
6:33 PM), https://time.com/4441752/baltimore-police-shooting-korryn-gains-instagram/

DN5N-VFR5].
88. Pamela Wood & Alison Knezevich, Jury Awards More Than $37M to Family of Korryn Gaines in
Civil CaseAgainst Baltimore County, BALT. SUN (Feb. 16,2018,4:45 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-county/bs-md-co-korryn-gaines-civil-deliberate-

8DRD].
89.

2

0180216-story.html [https://perma.cc/U9RL-

Id

90. Alison Knezevich, Judge Overturns $38M Verdict in Lawsuit over Baltimore County Police Killing of
Korryn Gaines, BALT. SuN (Feb. 15, 2019, 8:05 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimorecounty/bs-md-co-gaines-overtumed-20190215-story.html [https://perma.cc/6HEY-YTYE].
91. See Jacobs, supranote 64.

92.

Id

93. Police in the U.S. Killed 164 Black People in the First 8 Months of 2020. These Are Their Names.
(Part1: January-April), CBS NEWS (Sept.10, 2020,4:39 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/black-people-

killed-by-police-in-the-u-s-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/CK4H-ZC7E].
94.

6 Years Strong, BLACK LiVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/six-years-strong/ (last visited

Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/67X2-vAXR].
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have created a legal doctrine that provides little specific guidance for when police
may use force, and how much force is reasonable to use. 95 Without guidance on
these core ideas, police have installed bright-line rules of their own that are often
problematic, yet courts still rely on the perspective of police officers when determining what is reasonable. 96 We analyze the limits of payouts, specifically how
qualified immunity and payouts from municipalities rather than individuals influence litigation surrounding fatal police shootings. 97 Based on the clear need
for oversight of fatal police shootings, Part III considers the prevalence of these
killings based on government datasets. Available data sources indicate that even
though the number of these killings is substantial, there is no definitive governmental dataset that purports to keep a comprehensive annual record of these incidents. Part IV introduces The Washington Post's fatal police shootings dataset:
a comprehensive data collection effort on fatal police shootings that compiles
public reporting surrounding the circumstances of each shooting.98 The Washington Post's dataset reveals nearly 1,000 fatal police shootings each year from
2015-2018, with black victims being over-represented compared to their share
of the population. 99 Part V examines the size of wrongful death awards for police
shootings compared to other wrongful death claims. When payouts occur for
wrongful death claims in fatal police shootings, the settlement or jury verdict
amounts are highly variable, often below even a reasonable compensatory damages amount, and almost invariably short of the magnitude needed to create effective incentives for deterrence. 10 Part VI examines the principles used to set
these awards and contrasts them with the approach for deterrence-based
measures known as the value of a statistical life. The economic value of the mortality costs for unwarranted killings by police over the 2015-2018 period ranges
from $1 billion to $12 billion, depending on the criteria that are applied in determining which shootings are included in the assessment.1 0 1 If all deaths resulting
from police shootings are included, the cost rises to $39 billion.10 2 Further, we
discuss the deterrent effect on police officers of higher payouts from governments.103 Although there may be limits on the extent to which damages awards
can be increased to foster adequate levels of deterrence, the economic principles
for valuing mortality risks can serve as the framework for municipalities to undertake benefit-cost analyses of policies to promote responsible police behavior.104 Part VII outlines how these policy reforms fit into the current climate of
benefit-cost analyses for policing methods. Costs to the public of police use of
force have been difficult to quantify, but using the value of a statistical life allows

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

102.
103.
104.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion
discussion

infra Section I.A.
infra Section I.A.
infra Section I.C.
infra Part III.
infra Section IIA.
infra Part IV.
infra Section N.B.
infra Section I.B.
infra Part N.
infra Part VI.
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105
Part
for empirically measuring the cost of the lives of victims of fatal force.
VIII discusses how to create more effective deterrence for unwarranted police
shootings.

II.

WHEN CAN A POLICE OFFICER KILL YoU?

A police officer can legally kill you when the force that the officer uses is
106
There are some objective legal
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
criteria that determine the reasonableness of the force used by a police officer. 07
These criteria are based on different characteristics of the police interaction, such
as the severity of the possible crime and whether the suspect posed a significant
108
Additional concerns that
immediate threat, was armed, or fleeing the scene.
go beyond a police-centric benefit-cost approach also include consideration of
the well-being of the victim. 109 Despite efforts to clarify what is reasonable force,
however, there remains an important element of judgment involved in assessing
what is reasonable. Attempts by the courts to broadly define reasonable use of
force have created vacuums of clear guidance for which actions are permissible
when." 0 These vacuums are often filled by police themselves, allowing police
the chance to greatly expand the realm of which of their own actions are reasonable and thus constitutionally permitted."' Some police officers revert to brightline-yet deeply problematic-rules of thumb, such as justifiable, unlimited use
2
of force if a suspect is fleeing, or if an armed person is within twenty-one feet."
Whether the family of the victim of a police shooting has a basis for a
3
wrongful death claim also depends on the circumstances of the shooting." This
assessment is not based entirely on case-specific subjective judgments but rather
draws on specific legal criteria that protect government officials and municipalities from liability.114 Qualified immunity and the Monell doctrine provide indi11 5
vidual officers and municipalities protections from liability, respectively.
105.
106.

See discussion infra Part VI.

See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).

107. victor E. Kappeler, How Objective Is the "Objective Reasonableness" Standard in Police Brutality
Cases?, E. KY. UNIV. (Dec. 10, 2013), https://plsonline.eku.edu/insidelook/how-objective-"objective-reasonableness"-standard-police-brutality-cases# [https://perma.cc/QF5Q-7CAW].

108.
109.

Id.

See Overview ofPolice Use of Force,NAT'L INST. JUST. (Mar. 5, 2020), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/overview-police-use-force [https://perma.cc/5WNE-9FC4] (noting police should ensure injured individuals
receive medical attention).
110. See id.
111. See id
112. See von Kliem, The 21-Foot "Rule" is Back in the News!, FORCE ScL INST. (Sept. 12, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/J92Y-PRE2] (rehttps://www.forcescience.org/2019/09/the-21-foot-rule-is-back-in-the-news/
garding the 21-foot principle); cf Paul Bergman, How Much Force Officers Can Use DuringArrest, NOLO (Sept.

[https://
27, 2013), https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-much-force-can-officers-during-arrest.html
perma.cc/6CHK-F3TN].
113. Wrongful Death by Police, FtNDLAW (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.fmdlaw.com/injury/torts-and-personal-injuries/wrongful-death-by-police.html [https://perma.cc/ZQ4Y-745E].
114. Id.
115. See id. (mentioning qualified immunity extended to public employees); Orion De Nevers, A Dubious
Legal Doctrine Protects Citiesfrom Lawsuits Over Police Brutality, SLATE (June 2, 2020), https://slate.com/
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These doctrines make receiving payouts from even unreasonable use of force at
the hands of police officers more difficult. 116
Defining reasonability for police use of force has been an ongoing, contradictory process for the courts.11 7 This Part discusses the legal grounding for when
police officers can kill by reviewing three U.S. Supreme Court cases on use of
force. In the absence of clear guidance from these cases and other court rulings,
police officers have expanded their permission to kill with their own bright-line
rules. 18 Finally, doctrines that limit liability for police shootings essentially impede deterrence, yielding greater permission for police officers to kill. 119
A.

The Reasonable Use of Force

Three U.S. Supreme Court cases since the 1980s have shaped guidelines on
reasonable use of force by police officers, including factors that define reasonability such as whether a suspect is unarmed and whether the suspect is fleeing.1 20
These two specific factors have been present in the analysis of all three casesfirst as part of a bright-line rule prohibiting lethal force against unarmed, fleeing
suspects, then as just two factors among others to analyze holistically, for all uses
of force. 121 Understanding how the Court defines reasonable force informs how
lower courts, juries, and officers decide which uses of force are permitted.1 22
The level of violence that a police officer inflicts should be justified based
on the threat level from the suspect;123 as several of the above examples reflect,
however, the use of force often exceeds the threat level.1 24 In these cases, individuals can bring civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which holds officers acting
under the color of law liable for depriving others of their civil rights.12' The landscape of civil lawsuits involving police violence centers around 42 -U.S.C.
§ 1983, or what is often termed Section 1983.126

news-and-politics/2020/06/monell-supreme-court-qualified-immunity.html
[https://perma.ccNGR5-CZYB]
(regarding municipal protections through Monell).
116. De Nevers, supranote 115.
117. See Overview of Police Use of Force,supra note 109 (stating there is no agreed-upon definition of use
of force).
118. Jason Wells, How Police Officers Are Trained in the Use of Force, HUFFPOST (July 18, 2017, 1:54
PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/how-police-officers-are-trained-in-the-use-of-force_b_5966921ce4b524

d8fa7faa0 [https://perma.cc/3FCK-KWHL].

119. Michael C. Dorf, Would Eliminating Qualified Immunity SubstantiallyDeter Police Misconduct?,
VERDICT: JUSTIA (June 10, 2020), https://verdict.justia.com/2020/06/10/would-eliminating-qualified-immunitysubstantially-deter-police-misconduct [https://perma.cc/CD8Q-4VWW].
120. See Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2008).
121. Id. at 1128-36.
122. See id. at 1128.
123. Overview ofPolice Use of Force,supranote 109.
124. Amir Vera, ShouldPolice Use ofForceBe Regulated? The Answer Isn't Simple, and That's a Problem,
CNN (Sept. 30, 2018, 11:50 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/09/30/us/police-use-of-force-legislation/index.
html [https://perma.cc/3SW5-AK3C].

125.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

126. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 168-69 (1961). This case set the precedent for obtaining relief via
§ 1983 for constitutional rights violations at the hands of police officers.
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In the 1985 Tennessee v. Garnercase-a formative § 1983 case-the Supreme Court established that police officers may not use lethal force on an un127
The officer, Elton Hymon, saw that fifteen-year-old
armed fleeing suspect.
a robbery and was "reasonably sure" and "figured"
fleeing
was
Edward Garner
Officer Hymon believed that he could not catch the
128
unarmed.
that Garner was
29
eighth grader as Garner started to scale a fence.1 After calling out to the child
to stop, Hymon shot Garner in the back of the head, leading to his death a few
hours later.13 0 The father of Edward Garner sued the officer and others under
§ 1983.131
used to
In Garner, the Supreme Court ruled that deadly force may not be
13 2
Deterothers.
to
threat
apprehend a suspect that does not pose a significant
unrequires
reasonable
was
attempt
mining whether the police officer's seizure
133
benand
costs
the
Considering
derstanding the "totality of the circumstances."
efits of a general case of lethal use of force, the "suspect's fundamental interest
in his own life" is weighed against the government's own interest in promoting
law and justice.1 34 The court found that when a suspect is unarmed, the individual's interest in their life outweighs the government's interest to protect other
35
members of society from an unarmed suspect.1 This decision established a
bright-line rule that lower courts used in cases of36varying factual backgrounds:
killing a fleeing unarmed suspect is not justified.1
Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to
others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify
the use of deadly force to do so . . . A police officer may not seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect by shooting him dead. The Tennessee statute is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the use of deadly force
37
against such fleeing suspects.1
and
This bright-line rule is helpful because whether the suspect is unarmed
38
Court
The
questions.1
whether the suspect is fleeing are usually non-disputable

127.

128.
129.
130.

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
Id at 3.
Id at 4.

132.
133.
134.

Id.
Id at 5.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 8-9.
Id.

135.

Id. at 10.

131.

136.

See, e.g., Eberhardinger v. City of York, 782 F. App'x 180, 186 (3d Cir. 2019); Lytle v. Bexar County,

other justification for the
560 F.3d 404, 417 (5th Cir. 2009) ("It has long been clearly established that, absent any
felon who does not pose
fleeing
a
against
force
deadly
use
to
officer
a
police
for
unreasonable
is
it
force,
of
use

a sufficient threat of harm to the officer or others."); Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 483 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[D]eadly

to anyone."); Abraham
force cannot be used against an escaping suspect who does not pose an immediate danger

v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 1999).
137. Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
138. See generally Bright-Line Rule, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.comell.
edu/wex/bright-line.rule [https://perma.cc/UNM2--UMHC] (defining bright line-rule).
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correctly determined that cases that differ based on these observable facts warrant different analyses.1 39
What qualifies as dangerous or as an immediate threat, however, can be
open to interpretation in many cases. 140 If the officer has probable cause that the
suspect is a threat to officers or to others, the Garnerdecision establishes that it
is constitutional for police to use lethal force.1 4 1 Making this determination requires wading into the analysis of which uses of force are reasonable in nondangerous situations. 142 Another landmark U.S. Supreme Court case on police
use of force, Graham v. Connor, created factors for determining "reasonableness" for use of force broadly.1 43 But these factors today are overshadowed by
the stress placed on analyzing the "totality of the circumstances," and by the notion that the use of force should not be judged by hindsight of laypeople, but
rather by the perspective of a reasonable officer at the time of the use of force.144
The 1989 Supreme Court case of Graham considered broader instances of
police use of force in contexts other than police shootings, but which nevertheless have implications for police shootings.1 45 Diabetic Dethorne Graham asked
a friend to drive him to a convenience store to buy orange juice to prevent the
onset of an insulin reaction. 146 After noticing the long line in the store, Graham
quickly left, which Officer Connor found to be suspicious.1 47 Connor stopped
Graham's car, and in the process of trying to figure out the situation, Connor and
other officers inured Graham and prevented him from receiving care for his insulin reaction.' Graham passed out momentarily from a lack of insulin, which
the officers interpreted as a sign that Graham was drunk.149 At one point, Graham reached for his wallet to show an officer his diabetic card, but the officer
slammed Graham's head onto the police car.150 By the end of the interaction, the
police officers broke Graham's foot, caused cuts on his wrist, bruised his forehead, and injured his shoulder.1 5 1 Graham sued the police officers under Section
1983.1s2
The Court ruled that use of force claims are to be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard for searches and seizures. 153
While the thrust of Graham was analyzing use of force under the Fourth Amend-

139. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Alpert & William C. Smith, How Reasonable is the Reasonable Man?: Police
and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481, 490-91(1994).
140. Id
141. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.
142. See Harmon, supra note 120, at 1140.
143. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

144. Id
145.

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See id at 396-97.
Id at 388.
Id at 389.

Id
Id
Id
Id. at 390.
Id.
See id at 397.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

756

[Vol. 2021

ment's "objective reasonableness" standard, the opinion in Graham briefly grap4
Graham described that the
pled with the test of what force is reasonable.
"proper application" of the use of force requires analysis of "the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight." 155 These factors developed in Graham were to be considered on balance
156
With this generality, Graham has
in future instances of police use of force.
been widely cited in cases that allege excessive police use of force.15 7 However,
Graham doesn't narrow the scope of government interests as a justification for
use of force, and only mentions one such interest-making "an arrest or investi8
gatory stop."15
The objective reasonableness standard balances the individual's interests
159
with the government's interests in a similar benefit-cost method as Garnerdid.
However, the Court offers no rule or instruction as to what constitutes reasonableness, allowing this test to be applied in all circumstances of police use of
force, rather than the bright-line rule that was established in Garnerfor a specific
60
instance of police use of force.1 While the Court also balanced the interests of
each party in Garner, weighing the government's interests against the individual's, this reasoning was used as a means to develop a bright-line rule.161 That
rule then determined whether use of force was reasonable in that circumstance
going forward.1 62 In contrast, the Court used a similar benefit-cost balancing in
Graham as the primary analysis in determining whether the force for this one
63
specific case was objectively reasonable.1 Lower courts are then given little
guidance on how to analyze whether a given use of force was a proper application, or whether it was unreasonable.164
The Court also stated that the reasonableness of any use of force must be
determined from the perspective of the officers on the scene, "rather than with
65
the 20/20 vision of hindsight."1 This approach gives police officers and their
expert witnesses in litigation leeway in defining an "objective perspective" on
reasonable use of force. 66 Furthermore, the reasonableness of the officer is only
judged for the moment that force is used; actions that lead up to the moment force
154.

Id

155.

Id. at 396.

156.

Id

157.
159.
160.
161.

A Westlaw search on November 2, 2020 found 25,983 cases that cite Graham v. Connor.
See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
See id; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985).
Tennessee, 471 U.S. at 11.
Id at 8.

162.

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

158.

163. Id ("Determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is 'reasonable' under the Fourth
Amendment requires a careful balancing of 'the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.") (emphasis added) (quoting

United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
164. Id. at 397.
165. Id. at 396.
166. Id

No. 3]

DAMAGES TO DETER POLICE SHOOTINGS

757

is deployed are outside of the Fourth Amendment analysis.1 67 Police officers can
unilaterally create positions where use of force is reasonable in the moment, but
reasonable officers could have avoided such a moment from occurring at all.1 6 8
Critically analyzing the tactics that lead to police use of force deserves as much
scrutiny as the use of force themselves.16 As it currently stands, the Court's
analysis of the "totality of the circumstances" is limited in scope both due to the
focus from the officer's perspective and from beginning the analysis too late into
the interaction. 170

The factors identified in Graham-the severity of the crime, if the suspect
is a threat, if the suspect is resisting arrest, if the suspect is fleeing-are a starting
point for understanding reasonable use of force.' While application of these
factors may not resolve whether the killing was warranted in all situations, they
can be particularly helpful in indicating some classes of circumstances in which
lethal force is not warranted, such as when an unarmed suspect is fleeing the
scene, as in Garner.172 Yet without further direction on when these factors rule
out excessive use of force, Graham has resulted in courts falling back onto analyzing each case based on "the totality of the circumstances."1 73
The Supreme Court did not revisit the issue of reasonableness of police use
of force for nearly two decades until deciding Scott v. Harris.174 Victor Harris
was speeding at seventy-three miles per hour in a zone with a speed limit of fifty
when a deputy motioned for him to pull over.17 5 Instead, Harris led multiple
deputies on a six-minute chase, reaching speeds above eighty-five miles per hour
on two-lane roads. 176 Deputy Timothy Scott attempted to perform a maneuver to
end the chase, by bumping the back comer of Harris's car. 77 This maneuver sent
Harris and his vehicle off the road and into an embankment.1 78 The car crash left
Harris a quadriplegic.1 79 Harris sued Scott under Section 1983.180 While lower
courts dismissed the officer's motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision.' 8 ' Eight Justices concluded from video evidence that
Scott's actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of Harris because

167.

(2017).
168.

See Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 vA. L. REV. 211, 223

Id at 218.

169. See id.; Alpert & Smith, supra note 139, at 493-97 (listing five categories of antecedents ofpolice use
of force: the organizational atmosphere of the agency, the situation, the environment, the participants and their
relationships, and the sustained injuries).
170. Alpert & Smith, supra note 139, at 501.
171. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
172. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
173. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
174. See Harmon, supra note 120, at 1119-20.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 374 (2007).
Id at 374-75.
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 376.
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182
They instead
the Justices disagreed with the fact pattern of the lower courts.
believed that because Harris posed a risk to police and innocent bystanders dur83
ing the high-speed chase, Scott's use of force was reasonable.1
Referencing the previous two Supreme Court cases on use of force, the decision in Scott did not consider the facts of this case to be similar enough to that
of Garner. 184 The Garner rule, which courts have found is "clearly established
185
even in situations with diverse factual situations," could not help Harris, a flee186
ing suspect, driving over the speed limit, armed with only a car. Indeed, the
opinion of the Court, delivered by Justice Scalia, is that the attempt of Harris'
team to apply the legal test developed in Garner is "admirable," but it is still
necessary to "slosh our way through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness.'"1 8 The Court distinguished the lethal force involved in shooting a gun
from the force applied by ramming one car with another, and it deemed Harris
dangerous in his flight, compared to the unarmed victim fleeing on foot in Garner. 88 The Court continued to discredit the arguments of Harris by reviewing
Garner and upending years of precedent and understanding of Garner by claiming that Garner did not establish a rule: "Garner did not establish a magical
on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer's actions constitute 'deadly force.' Garner was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment's 'reasonableness' test .... "189 This further analysis of Garner recasts
Garner from a bright-line rule to an application without re-emphasizing the benefit-cost analysis of weighing suspects' interest in their own lives against the
government's interest in making the arrest. This analysis was contrary to decades
of lower court rulings, and it weakened a well-defined rule for police use of
force.1 90 Instead, for each new case of police use of force, the Court suggested
19 1
relying on a judicial interpretation of reasonableness.
The Court in Scott considered the principles of Graham, that governmental
92
interests ought to be weighed against the interests of the individual.1 But the
Graham factors for analyzing police use of force to help balance these intereststhe severity of the crime and whether the suspect was a threat, resisting arrest, or
fleeing-were not explicitly cited.1 93 The Scott Court did not apply the "clearly

182.
183.
184.
185.
404,417
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id

at 378-81.

Id

Id

at 382-83.
Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 699 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Lytle v. Bexar Cnty., Tex., 560 F.3d
(5th Cir. 2009).
Scott, 550 U.S. at 374-75, 382.
Id. at 383.
See id
Id at 382.
See id
See id.
Id at 383.
See Harmon, supra note 120, at 1136.
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established" Garner rule, and in balancing the interests of the two parties, neglected to cite the specific factors that were established in Graham to weigh party
interests. 194
The doctrine resulting from these three Supreme Court cases establishes
that all police uses of force must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.1 9 5
Courts recognize that this standard involves the weighing of a suspect's rights
against the government's rights.1 96 Beyond that, the Supreme Court has provided
few practical rules for reasonable force; instead, it has only weighed in on a few
applications of the test.19 7 Now, courts must resort to analyzing the "totality of
the circumstances" to establish, after the fact and from an officer's perspective,
whether the force was reasonable.1 98 This leaves officers, and those who train
officers, without clear guidance on what reasonable force looks like.' 99
B.

Misperceptions Regarding the Reasonable Use ofForce

Misperceptions surrounding the reasonableness for fatal use of force
abound, especially in the police community. 200 There are several documented
cases of police, in the immediate aftermath of a police shooting, defending the
decision to use lethal force because the suspect was running. 2 One example
from 2015 is an officer in Tulsa, Oklahoma, who detained Eric Harris after another officer shot the unarmed, fleeing Harris in the back. 202 An officer's body
camera captures Harris, dying, telling the police, "I'm losing my breath," to
which one officer replies, "Fuck your breath." 203 The officer kneeling Harris's
head into the concrete in the video reveals how the officer justifies the fatal
shooting when he states, "You fucking ran. So shut the fuck up." 204 Notably, the
officer who killed Harris was convicted of second-degree manslaughter and sentenced to serve four years in prison.205 Additionally, the killings of Samuel
Dubose and Walter Scott feature officers who justify their decision, either at the
time or later in court, because the shooting victim fled. 206

194.

Id

195.

See id at 1140.

196.
197.

See id. at 1136.
Id. at 1130-31.

198.

Alpert & Smith, supra note 139, at 501.

199.
200.

Id.

202.
203.
204.

Id at 64.

See id. at 496.
201. Nancy C. Marcus, From Edward to Eric Garner and Beyond: The Importance of Constitutional Limitations on Lethal Use of Force in Police Reform, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 53, 64-67, 78-80 (2016).
Id

Id

205. Corey Jones, Robert Bates Releasedfrom Prison After Serving 1 %2 Years of a Four-Year Sentence for
Killing Eric Harris, TULSA WORLD (Jan. 27, 2021), https://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/
robert-bates-released-from-prison-after-serving-years-of-a/article_a6eal6be-d5eb-5b7b-9be2-dd10265cac
5b.html [https-/perma.cc/N9GD-Y7NV] (showing that Officer Robert Bates served 37% of that sentence before
being released at the age of seventy-six).
206. Marcus, supra note 201, at 64-67, 78-80.
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The application of the reasonableness test in Garner could have created a
207
While individbright-line rule-one that would directly apply in these cases.
ual officers may not have Supreme Court cases on mind during these shootings,
officer training could be tailored to comply with bright-line rules. 208 Currently,
predicting judicial interpretations of reasonable use of force from Graham and
Scott creates ambiguity. 209 Shooting to kill unarmed suspects because they are
2 10
But it is a
fleeing is a rule that eliminates the ambiguity for police officers.
21 1
misperception of what reasonable force is, and one that officers maintain.
Officers often have another misperception regarding their use of lethal
force, due to the so called 21-foot rule.2 12 The 21-foot rule was developed in
1983 by Salt Lake City Officer Dennis Tueller, who conducted a "rudimentary
series of tests and concluded that an armed attacker who bolted toward an officer
could clear twenty-one feet in the time it took most officers to draw, aim and fire
their weapon." 2 13 His article on the 21-foot rule was published in the magazine
SWAT, where, after explaining the concept, he writes, "[i]t would be safe to say
214
then that an armed attacker at 21 feet is well within your Danger Zone."
Since its inception, the 21-foot rule has been informally taught as a brightline rule to police officers to justify the use of lethal force when someone has an
edged weapon and is nearby enough to an officer. 215 Instead of using the idea as
a rule of thumb for maintaining a safe distance from armed suspects, the 21-foot
rule has been cited to justify deadly force when preventative tactics could have
deescalated the situation.2 16 The Chief of the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, Cathy Lanier, noted at the May 7, 2015, Police Executive Reform Forum that the 21-foot rule was a "huge driver" for the "first decision that

207. See Harmon, supra note 120,at 1128, 1137.
208. See Mitchell W. Karsch, Excessive Forceand the Fourth Amendment: When Does Seizure End?, 58
FORDHAM L. REv. 823, 827 (1990).
209. See Harmon, supra note 120, at 1184-1185.
210. Jason Lee Steorts, When Should Cops Be Able to Use Deadly Force?, ATL. (Aug. 27, 2015), https://
4
[https://perma.cc/7AUQwww.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/08/use-of-deadly-force-police/ 02181/
ZP57].
211. Bergman, supra note 112.
212. Matt Apuzzo, Police Rethink Long Tradition on Using Force, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), https://
[https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/us/police-start-to-reconsider-longstanding-rules-on-using-force.html
perma.cc/E88T-7U5G].
213. Id.
214. Dennis Tueller, How Close is Too Close?, POLICE POL'Y STUDS. COUNCIL, http://www.theppsc.
org/Staff_Views/Tueller/How.Close.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7VEC-WMGE].
215. POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 20 (2016) ("Although some have
claimed that few officers today are formally trained in the '21-foot rule,' many police chiefs have said that the
21-foot-rule continues to be disseminated informally. PERF's research into recent incidents revealed examples
of the "rule" being cited by officers or their attorneys to justify shootings of suspects with edged weapons."); see
also POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., RE-ENGINEERING TRAINING ON POLICE USE OF FORCE 15 (2015).
216. During investigation of his 2015 fatal shooting of Fridoon Nehad in which Nehad was seventeen-feet
away from the officer and holding a knife, San Diego Police Officer Neal Broward stated, "When I first came
on, we would always use the 21-foot rule." The investigation report is conflicted on whether the officer used deescalatory tactics such as verbal warnings. See Letter from Bonnie M. Dumanis, San Diego Dist. Att'y, to Shelly
Zimmerman, San Diego Police Chief 5-6 (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Midway-OIS-Letter-FINAL-11-9-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/CS7X-v4EF].
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went wrong" and resulted in officers using force.2 17 She continued: "A lot of our
shootings involved people with mental health issues armed with a knife, up on a
porch, 30 feet away. And instead of taking cover and waiting, the officers would
approach and shoot, and then say, 'Well, we were justified
in shooting; the per2 18
son was within 21 feet and had an edged weapon."'
Police officers face many split-second decisions, some of which may result
in life-or-death outcomes for themselves and others. 2 19 Just as Officer Noor "relied on his training" before killing Justine Damond, officers rely on their own
training to make immediate decisions in these high-stakes moments. 220 The lack
of guidance on reasonable use of force has resulted in misperceptions abounding
in police officer training.221 Proper guidance from the courts should inform training to correct these misperceptions.
But even if these misperceptions are eliminated, police officers will still
shoot and kill suspects. Often before reaching the question of whether the use of
force was unreasonable, legal doctrines limiting liability present difficulties for
victims or their families seeking to recover.
C.

LegalDifficultiesfor Deterrents to Police Shootings

Wrongful death claims for police shootings are based on a standard theory
of negligence with death as the injury.222 However, there are many difficulties
that families of decedents face in receiving a payout at all.
Reducing the chances of a payout for families of decedents is the fact that
officers have qualified immunity. 2 3 The status of qualified immunity protects
officers "from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." 224 The resulting landscape surrounding qualified immunity
means that an officer cannot be tried for violating an individual's constitutional
rights unless it was "clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful
in the situation he confronted." 22 5 When considered in the context of the Supreme Court rulings on police use of force, qualified immunity covers more and

217.

POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., RE-ENGINEERING TRAINING ON POLICE USE OF FORCE, supranote 215, at 17.

218. Id.
219. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 167, at 223.
220. Scott Johnson, At the Noor Trial (19), POwERLINE (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.powerlineblog.
com/archives/2019/04/at-the-noor-trial-19.php [https://perma.cc/4F2S-5Z8F].
221. Fed. L. Enft Training Ctrs., Use of Force-Myths and Realities Part I (MP3), FLETC, https://www.
fletc.gov/audio/use-force-myths-and-realities-part-i-mp3 (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7RJ9-

DG2U].
222. See, e.g., Page v. Amtrak, Inc., 168 F.Supp.3d 337, 342 (D. Me. 2016).
223. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, The Case Against QualifiedImmunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1797, 1798 (2018) (discussing how qualified immunity's wide application protects most officers from liability);
Joanna C. Schwartz, How QualifiedImmunity Fails, 127 YALE L.J. 2, 6 (2017) (discussing the Supreme Court's
apparent desire to curb lawsuits against police by use of qualified immunity doctrine).

224.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

225.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).
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more questionable actions from the police as conflicting doctrine makes predicting legality of police behavior more difficult. 226 When the court finds that a police officer is not liable for his or her behavior because the officer is granted
qualified immunity, recovering damages from officers, their supervisor, or the
227
municipality, becomes nearly impossible.
Further, trial courts bifurcate allegations against individual officers and
municipalities in § 1983 cases.228 This structure stems from the 1986 Supreme
Court ruling of City of Los Angeles v. Heller, where juries must first find that
officers violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights before proceeding in trial
against the municipality. 229 This bifurcation narrows the scope of litigation to
case-by-case factual claims as opposed to systemic issues that arise from the municipality's policies or customs. 3 Due to the Court's ruling in Monell v. Department of Social Services, if the case does proceed against the municipality,
the plaintiff must then show that the constitutional violation was due to the policies or customs of the municipality, and not simply because of an officer's actions.231 This makes holding municipalities liable under § 1983 claims very difficult.232
While payouts to the victims' families in the form of jury awards or settlements are atypical, charges and convictions to the offending police officers are
even rarer. 233 The circumstances for each shooting are unique, and the legality
of many killings may be unquestioned. 234 However, the Black Lives Matter
movement, aided by the diffusion throughout society of video recording, has
challenged the legality of many fatal police shootings over the years. 2 In the
past fourteen years, only 104 nonfederal police officers have been arrested for
manslaughter or murder. 236 In thirty-six of these incidents, the police officers
have been convicted, but only four officers were convicted of murder for an onduty shooting, including Officer Noor mentioned at the beginning of this Article. 237 The other police officers who have been convicted were convicted on

226.
227.
228.
229.

Harmon, supra note 120, at 1141.
Id
See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
Id

230.

See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 167, at 239.
Id.

231.
232.

See id.; City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (finding that a plaintiff must show that

training was "deliberately indifferent" to constitutional rights).
233. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 31.

234.

See Scott v. Harris. 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).

235. Mark Hoekstra & CarlyWill Sloan, Does Race Matter for Police Officer Use ofForce? Evidence from
911 Calls 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26774, 2020).
236. Philip M. Stinson, If Minnesota Officer Had Been White, Would He Have Been Convicted?, USA

(May 23, 2019, 6:44 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/policing/spotlight/2019/05/
ficer-murder-minnesota/1145769001/ [https://perma.cc/JWT2-AKUT].
237. Id.
TODAY
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238
_Acharges ranging from reckless discharge of a firearm up to manslaughter.
rests and convictions of police officers are unlikely to serve as a primary means
of creating deterrence of fatal police shootings. 239
The choice of the Court to focus on analyzing "the totality of the circumstances" while also limiting analysis to specific police actions instead of tactics
that lead up to use of force does not create clear guidance for officers. 240 Further,
the decision to "slosh" through the "factbound morass" 241 of each case prevents
police departments from developing clear rules on acceptable uses of force. 242
With that absence, and with greater calls from the public to limit use of force, or
at least properly define reasonable use of force, police officers have internalized
their own set of rules. 243 These rules may often violate Fourth Amendment rights,
but they seem reasonable to officers, and thus courts give deference to their perspective.244 The result is a lack of guidance from the courts and the continuation
of public confusion and anger towards police overuse of force incidents and their
ensuing litigation.245
Positive empirical analysis about police behavior remains difficult to extend to normative conclusions under this lack of legal guidance. 246 We concur
with the benefit-cost reasoning in Garner that a fleeing and unarmed suspect
values their life more so than the value to the state of the benefits from using
lethal force to seize them. 247 However, as we've seen in Scott, if the suspect's
flight is dangerous to others-by speeding through stoplights to avoid capture,
for example-then the societal costs have been increased, leading the Court to
alter its prior reasoning. 24 8
Since the "factbound morass" of each case may be vast, documenting basic
features of police interactions, fatal or otherwise, has become necessary to understand the scope of the problem of police violence.2 49 How often do police
interact with citizens? How often does the confrontation end with a fatality? How
many of these victims are unarmed and fleeing? The aftermath of these fatal
cases is also worth analyzing. What happens in litigation after such a violation

238.
239.

Id.

Cf Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 846 (2012)
(discussing the lack of deterrent effect from high-profile civil suits and damage awards after fatal police shoot-
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240.
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246. See generallyColin Loftin et al., UnderreportingofJustifiableHomicides Committedby Police Officers in the United States, 1976-1998, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1117, 1121 (2003) (analyzing the unreliability of
justifiable homicide statistics produced by the two leading government reporting programs).
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Scott v. Harris, 500 U.S. 372, 386 (2007).
Id. at 383.
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of an individual's constitutional rights? Is the optimal amount of deterrence in
place to limit these violations? These are all questions that this Article addresses
either by providing an analysis of the issue or by indicating the path to developing an answer to these questions.
III. GOVERNMENTAL ESTIMATES OF POLICE USE OF FORCE

Police shootings that lead to fatalities receive substantial media attention
relative to some other risks, such as auto accidents. 250 Assessing the overall prevalence of police shootings has been hampered by the absence of reliable data.
Governmental databases provide a partial, longer term perspective on police
shootings.2 51 The Centers for Disease Control has maintained the National Vital
Statistics System, and the Bureau of Justice Statistics has maintained the Uniform Crime Reports system.252 Each of these databases employs a different approach and provides evidence of frequent police shootings.
Despite the policy prominence of police shootings in the media, governmental agencies do not maintain a comprehensive and precise tracking of the
prevalence and circumstances of these shootings. At present, the Bureau of Jus254
tice Statistics and the Centers for Disease Control do monitor such deaths, the
classifications of which are described below. Although this Article considers
their data, their data series are not comprehensive and do not address the circumstances of the shootings. To fill this void, The Washington Post initiated a comprehensive assessment of fatal police shootings beginning in 2015.255 As the next
Part will demonstrate, The Washington Postdata indicate that the number of fatal
police shootings is almost 1,000 per year. 256 Over one-fourth of those fatalities
involve situations that may have lacked a strong basis for such a shooting, such
as victims who are unarmed and not fleeing the scene, victims who are unarmed

250.

See Rachel A. Harmon, FederalPrograms and the Real Costs of Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REv. 870,

942 (2015).
251. Catherine Barber et al., Homicides by Police: Comparing Counts from the National violent Death
Reporting System, vital Statistics, and Supplementary Homicide Reports, 106 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 922, 922

(2016).
252.

Id

253.

Id

254. See id Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs) are created and maintained by the Bureau of Justice Statistics
in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and are available for download here:
https://www.ucrdatatool.gov/ [https://perma.cc/2HRF-v7NJ]. The National vital Statistics System is administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and is available here: https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/in-

dex.htm [https://perma.cc/K6v3-KDNG].
255. See Julie Tate et al., FatalForce,WASH. POST [hereinafter WASH. PoST Database], https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-database/ [(last visited Mar. 17, 2021) https://perma.
cc/4JWZ-XCFK] (providing current updates to an ongoing database that tracks instances of killing by police
officers).

256.

Id.
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but are fleeing, and victims who are armed and fleeing. 257 In each of these instances, blacks comprise a disproportionate share of the victims. 258 The data discussed below indicate that this high black representation is particularly likely
when the use of fatal force is least warranted because the victim is unarmed.25 9
Given the prominence of police shootings in public discussions of police
behavior and in providing the impetus for the Black Lives Matter movement, one
would expect that government agencies would seek to identify the number of
police killings, their demographic profile, and the circumstances under which the
shootings occurred. Documenting such information could assist in designing and
implementing police procedures to prevent unwarranted killings. 260 In our review of the governmental data below, we find that the governmental efforts to
track fatal police shootings are lacking both in terms of keeping track of the number of shootings and the nature of the incidents that led to the shootings. 26 1 Thus,
the data fall short in terms of being able to assess which shootings are problematic and the frequency of these unwarranted fatalities.
Two longstanding databases for measuring fatalities from police use of
force are the National Vital Statistics System ("NVSS")--maintained by the
Centers for Disease Control ("CDC")-and the Supplementary Homicide Reports ("SHRs")-maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") in
its Uniform Crime Reports system. 262 The NVSS tracks deaths by "legal intervention," which refers to "deaths caused by law enforcement and other persons
with legal authority to use deadly force, excluding legal executions." 263 The selfreported SHRs track "justifiable homicides," which the FBI define as the "killing
of a felon by a peace officer in the line of duty." 264 This definition for justifiable
homicides appears to exclude killings of non-felons or innocent suspects, but
regardless, the count of justifiable homicides in the SHRs remain the best way,
relying on the FBI data, to track killings by the police.2 65
A snapshot of police shootings for the year 2016 from these two systems
shows significant differences between these governmental databases. The SHRs

257.
258.

Id.
Id.

259. See WASH. POST Database, supra note 255; Sarah DeGue et al., Deaths Due to Use ofLethal Forceby
Law Enforcement, 51 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. S173, S173 (2016).
260. See WASH. POST DATABASE, supra note 255; Fighting Police Abuse: A Community Action Manual,
AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 1997), https://www.aclu.org/other/fighting-police-abuse-community-actionmanual [https://perma.cc/U424-YRWV].
261.

See WASH. POST DATABASE, supra note 255.

262. Catherine Barber et al., Homicides by Police: Comparing Counts from the National violent Death Reporting System, vital Statistics, and Supplementary Homicide Reports, 106 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 922,922 (2016).
263. See Bridget H. Lyons et al., Surveillance for violent Deaths-National violent Death Reporting System, 17 States, 2013, 65 MMWR SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1, 1 (2016); see also Howard E. Williams et al.,
The Limitations of Government Databases for Analyzing Fatal Officer-Involved Shootings in the United States,
20 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 201, 201-02 (2016).
264. Loftin et al., supra note 246, at 1118.
265. Id.; See Services, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ucr (last visited
Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/MZ6R-F4P2].
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report that there were 444 justifiable homicides in 2016.266 The NVSS reports
267
549 deaths by legal intervention that year. This discrepancy is larger than what
268
The difference between the two
has been typically found in previous studies.
datasets, however, is only a minor problem compared to the finding that both
governmental datasets dramatically undercount the number of fatalities at the
hands of police.269 The datasets have been measured to undercount the true number of killings by the police by over 50%.270
A study of these two reporting databases over 1976 to 2013 identified dif27
ferent systematic reasons each database underreports fatal police shootings. 1
The NVSS underreports the number of fatal police shootings due to misclassification of homicides when a medical examiner or coroner does not describe police
involvement in the death. 272 The SHRs underreports police shootings since it
does not purport to be a comprehensive census of all such deaths but rather a
survey that relies on voluntary participation of local law enforcement, who may
fail to file any report at all and often omit homicides committed by law enforcement. 273 A 2015 Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that these two systems
274
provided unreliable measures of arrest-related deaths.
The advantage of these governmental datasets is their longevity. Although
these two reporting systems are less reliable than more modern databases, they
extend back in time. The data include years as early as the 1960s for the SHRs
and 1933 for the NVSS. 275 Each of these datasets has undergone extensive revi276
sions to their systematic data collection system over the years.

266. See Expanded Homicide Data Table 14: Justified Homicide, 2017 Crime in the United States, FBI:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/tables/expandedhomicide-data-table-14.xls (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/FTC2-8TLG] (documenting 444 "justifiable homicides" by law enforcement in 2016).
267. See Deaths, Percent of Total Deaths and Rank Order for 113 Selected Causes of Death and Enterocolitis Due to Clostridium Difficile by Race & Hispanic Origin, and Sex, United States, 2016, Ctrs. Disease Control
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268. See Colin Loftin, David McDowall & Min Xie, Underreportingof Homicides by Police in the United
States, 1976-2013, 21 HOMICIDE STUDS. 159, 164 (2017); Loftin et al., supra note 246, at 1118-21; Barber et
al., supra note 262, at 925.
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270. Id.
271. Loftin, McDowall & Xie, supra note 268, at 159.

272.
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Id. at 159-60.
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PROFILE, 16-17 (2015).
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The CDC established the National Violent Death Reporting System
("NVDRS") in 2003.277 The NVDRS serves as a more accurate count of police
shooting fatalities, which are counted in the database as legal interventions.2 78
Legal interventions are defined in the NVDRS as situations in which the "decedent was killed by a police officer or other peace officer (persons with specified
legal authority to use deadly force), including military police, acting in the line
of duty." 279 The NVDRS is compiled by abstractors at the state level who review
the death certificate, the coroner's report, and any police report to summarize
several different recordable aspects of a violent death. 280 The NVDRS started in
only six states in 2003, and today covers forty states, with the intention to expand
to all states. 281
In a comparison of the SHRs from the FBI, and the NVSS and NVDRS
from the CDC, the SHRs captured 48% of 1,552 police homicides in sixteens
states that were reported in the NVDRS at the time from 2005-2012.282 The
NVSS reported 58% of these homicides found in the NVDRS that covered 16
states at the time. 283 Still, the NVDRS-while far more reflective of actual police
homicide counts in the states that it measures than the SHRs or NVSS-is missing cases that are captured in The Washington Post's fatal police shootings database, which is described in Part IV. 284
The government does collect survey information on citizen interactions
with the police through the Police-Public Contact Survey administered by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 285 These data are self-reported but provide further
insight into police use of force, among other topics such as who initiated the
contact, whether the officer improved the situation, and whether the officer behaved properly. 28 6 In the 2015 Contacts Between Police and the Public report,
the Bureau of Justice Statistics surveyed 70,959 respondents nationwide and extrapolated their findings to the age sixteen and older population of the United
States. 287 The Bureau of Justice Statistics finds that of the 53 million people with
police contact in 2015, 1.8%, or nearly one million people, reported experiencing
force during the police encounter. 288 There are some demographic differences in
277. Lyons et al., supra note 263, at 2; Homicides and Suicides - National Violent Death Reporting System,
United States, 2003-2004, Ctrs. Disease Control & Prevention (July 7, 2006), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pre-

view/mmwrhtml/mm5526al.htm [https://perma.cc/YD7B-UA84].
278.
279.

REGOECZI ET AL., supra note 275, at 4; Homicides and Suicides supra note 277.
Barber et al., supra note 262, at 923.

280.

Id

281. NVDRS State Profiles: The Reach ofNVDRS, CTRS. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/datasources/nvdrs/stateprofiles.html [https://perma.cc/2UB6-KE7V].
282. Barber et al., supra note 262, at 922.

283. Id
284. Id; see WASH. POST Database, supra note 255; infra Part II.
285. Data Collection: Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS), Bureau Just. Stats., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm7ty=dcdetail&iid=251 (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/5EDC-GTGF]; see ELIZABETH
DAVIS ET AL., BUREAU JUST. STATS., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2015 (2018).

286. See sources, supra note 285.
287. See DAVIS ET AL., supra note 285, at 20.
288. Id at 16. Any police-contact refers to police-initiated contact or resident-initiated contact. Experienced
Force includes threatening use of force, pushing or grabbing, handcuffing, hitting or kicking, using chemical or
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the rate of nonlethal contact, as 2.7% of males who interacted with police experienced force compared to 0.9% of females, while 3.3% of black people with
289
police interactions experienced force compared to 1.3% for white people.
A nongovernmental, causal analysis of the effect of officer race on use of
force found that white officers were 60% more likely to use force than black
officers, and twice as likely to use gun force. 290 The researchers used a universe
of two million 9-1-1 calls in two cities, where dispatch calls do not allow officer
discretion to attend the call or not.291 With approximately randomly assigned 91-1 calls, white officers were observed using gun force in predominantly black
292
neighborhoods at a rate five times that of black officers.
While these figures relate primarily to nonlethal use of force, the findings
from the Police-Public Contact Survey and the 9-1-1 call research bear out a
similar story to the fatal shootings in The Washington Post database examined
below: police use force against black people at much higher rates than against
293
white people.

IV. THE WASHINGTONPOST'S FATAL FORCE DATABASE

The undercounting of fatal police shootings in the governmental databases
294
is not an inherent problem of keeping track of the number of such deaths. Rather, the databases were not designed for the specific purpose of accounting for
29
the number of deaths from police shootings throughout the country. 1 The Washington Post launched a more comprehensive effort, which is explored in this Part
and will provide the empirical basis for this Article's assessment of both the
number of deaths from police shootings, the number of deaths involving different
degrees of reasonableness of the shooting, and the monetized value of the mortality cost associated with the deaths.
A.

The Washington Post's FatalForce Database

In an effort to address the inadequacy of the data on fatalities resulting from
police shootings, The Washington Post has collected data on every recorded fatal
on-duty police shooting since January 1, 2015.296 The database only includes
victims who were killed by shootings, or shootin s and taserings, but not other
29
The Postgathers information
manners of death at the hands of police officers.
by aggregating local news reports, police reports, other independent databases,
pepper spray, using an electroshock weapon, or pointing a gun, and does not include if the police only shouted
at them, cursed at them, threatened to arrest them or threatened to give them a ticket.
289. Id Both of these differences are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval.
290. Hoekstra & Sloan, supra note 235.

291.
292.

Id

293.
294.
295.
296.

See
See
See
See

297.

Id

at 2.
Id at 4.
id.; supra Part m.
WASH. PosT Database, supra note 255.
id
id.
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as well as by conducting their own reporting on some cases. 298 Information pro-

vided in the database includes name and demographic characteristics of the victim, date and location of shooting, how the victim was armed (if at all), whether
the victim was attacking anyone, whether the victim was fleeing, if the officer
was wearing a body camera, and whether the victim was experiencing a mental
health crisis. 299

This independent tracking of police lethal use of force and the contexts in
which force is used is critical for understanding the scope of the problem. In each
year since 2015, The Washington Post logs on average twice as many deaths
from on-duty police shootings as both the FBI's SHRs and the CDC's NVSS 300

'

The Washington Postdoes not report data on deaths while incarcerated, off-duty
shootings, or non-shooting deaths at the hands of police.30
TABLE

1.

FATAL POLICE SHOOTINGS FROM 2015 TO 2018 BY RACE/ETHNICITY
Total
White
Black
Hispanic
Other
Missing Race
Total Fatal Police
Shootings
Count
3,934
1,873
944
675
164
278
Percent
100
48
24
17
4
7
Victim Unarmed and

Fleeing
Count
Percent

114
100

41
36

48
42

21
18

3
3

1

141

100

65
46

45
32

25
18

6
4

0
0

955
100

409
43

264
28

185
19

34
4

63
7

2,356
100

1,200
51

491
21

373
16

106
4

186
8

368
100

158
43

96
26

71
19

15
4

28
8

l

Victim Unarmed and

Not Fleeing
Count
Percent
Victim Armed and
Fleeing
Count
Percent
Victim Armed and
Not Fleeing
Count
Percent
Victim's Armed or

Fleeing Status
Not Reported
Count
Percent

Notes: Data come from The Washington Post's Fatal Force database and cover the years 2015 to 2018.
The Post collects this data from local news reporting, police reports, social media, and other independent
police shooting databases. If the race/ethnicity of the victim is not reported or identified in any of The
Post's reporting, they are marked as "missing race." Two hundred forty-five victims have a missing
armed status, 134 have a missing fleeing status, and 11 have both. A victim is recorded as "fleeing" by
The Post if they fled on foot, in a vehicle, or otherwise. While 56% of "armed" victims are reported to
have guns, the definition for "armed" extends to: toy weapons, flashlights, oars, pens, staplers, a claim
to be armed, and unknown or undetermined weapons.

298.
299.
300.
301.

Id
See id
Id
Id
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Table 1 summarizes the Fatal Force database from The Washington Post.

Police officers shot and killed at least 3,934 people in the United States from
January 1, 2015 to December 31, 2018, nearly 1,000 shooting deaths from police
30
of
a year, or 2.7 a day. 302 Overall, 95% of victims were male. The median age304
ninety-one.
to
six
from
ranges
a victim was 35, though the age of all victims
Over these four years for which The Washington Post has complete annual data,
305
No month
each year has nearly the same number of police shooting fatalities.
more
with
month
dangerous
or season stands out as representing a particularly
over
month
per
shootings
police
shootings. Figure 1 plots the number of fatal
four
past
the
over
shootings
police
fatal
of
this four-year period. The distribution
shootings
police
fatal
100
to
full years has been relatively uniform, with seventy
in most months.306 A simple linear regression analysis of the number of shootings in a month on time is plotted over this data to show a minor downward
307
temporal trend in the number of fatal police shootings.
FIGURE

1. FATAL

POLICE SHOOTINGS 2015-2018
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302. See Julie Tate, Jennifer Jenkins & Steven Rich, Fatal Force, WASH. POST, https://www.washing1
tonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/police-shootings-20 9/? (Aug. 10, 2020) [https://perma.cc/F7MT-FFB5]
Database].
POST
WASH.
2019
[hereinafter
303. Id.; WASH. POST Database, supra note 255.
304. See WASH. POST Database, supra note 255.
305. See 2019 WASH. POST Database, supra note 302.
306. Id.
307. Id.
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CharacteristicsofShootings in the FatalForce Database

Based on aggregated reports on each case, The Washington Post lists the

circumstances of 63% of these fatal shootings as an attack in progress. 308 The
database reports 56% of victims were armed with a gun, 7% are explicitly listed
as unarmed, another 11% are listed as "undetermined," involving an "unknown
weapon," or have missing information on how, if at all, they were armed. 309 Another 15% were armed with knives, while the remaining victims were armed with
items including the following: a baseball bat, a machete, a toy weapon, a rake, a
stapler, a rock, a vehicle, a garden tool, an air conditioner, and a cordless drill. 310
In 24% of cases, there was clear reporting that the shooting victim displayed signs of mental illness or was suffering a mental health crisis. 31 This
assessment includes after-the-fact statements that the family provided. 312 In only
11% of cases were there reports that a police officer had a body camera turned
on. 313 The Washington Post reports that about half of the nation's 18,000 law
enforcement agencies have some type of body camera program, although the requirements for when an officer must wear a camera or record an incident differ
greatly between departments. 314 None of the governmental databases indicate
whether the killing was recorded using a body camera. 315
Of those killed, 24% were black, 316 which is nearly twice the percentage of
black people in the general population of the United States, 13.4%.317 Of
the
955 killings of persons who were armed and fleeing-on foot, in a vehicle, or
otherwise-28% were black.3 18 Of the 141 killings of unarmed people who were
not fleeing over these four years, 32% were black, and of the 114 killings of
victims who were unarmed and were fleeing, 42% were black. 3 19 This final category of data from The Washington Post highlights the most problematic of the
police shootings. More unarmed and fleeing black people have been shot and
308.
309.

Id
Id.

310.

WASH. POST Database, supra note 255.

311.

Id

312. For example, Travis James Eckstein, twenty-three, was shot and killed after exchanging fire with U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol officers at the San Ysidro port of entry, and his family and girlfriend described afterwards his recent bipolar diagnosis and ongoing depression. See Melissa Adan, San Ysidro POE Gunman Suffered
from Mental Illness: Family, NBC SAN DIEGO (June 5, 2019, 8:57 PM), https://www.nbcsandiego.com/newslo-

cal/Family-of-Suspected-San-Ysidro-Port-of-Entry-Gunman-Says-23-Year-Old-Suffered-From-Mental-Illness510894551.html [https://perma.cc/U3N6-YM4Y].
313. See WASH. POST Database, supra note 255.
314. Kimberly Kindy, Some U.S. Police Departments Dump Body-Camera Programs amid High Costs,
WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2019, 4:31 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/some-us-police-departments-

dump-body-camera-programs-amid-high-costs/2019/01/21/991f0e66-03ad-l

l e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_ story.

html [https://perma.cc/NX5E-AJ6D].

315.

Id

316. See WASH. POST Database, supra note 255 (analysis includes the 372 victims with a missing race, or
ethnicity, in the database).
317. QuickFacts,U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PSTo45218 (last
visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9AJ9-NYZF].
318. See WASH. POST Database, supra note 255.

319.

Id.
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killed by police than unarmed and fleeing white people despite the vast differ320
For the category in which the culpability of
ence in their population shares.
the victim may be least-those who were unarmed and fleeing-the share of
32 1
black victims is 42%, higher than any other category.
Much of the recent media coverage of fatal police shootings surrounds
black male victims, a category of victims the data show as overrepresented in all
322
The data throughout the rest of this Article
types of fatal police shootings.
to families of victims of all races and
provided
damages
on
primarily focuses
a
practical matter, the following datasets
as
First,
reasons.
ethnicities for several
on jury awards and settlements do not distinguish based on race. But furthermore,
optimal deterrence of fatal police shootings that police officers face should not
depend on the victim's race. In the next Part, we consider statistics for payouts
from wrongful deaths, compared to the subset of wrongful deaths by police, for
both jury verdicts and settlements.
V.

HOW MUCH ARE PAYOUTS FOR WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS?

To get an assessment of the adequacy of wrongful death settlements and
awards after police shootings, it is useful to have a reference point for what such
valuations are in other wrongful death contexts. This Part begins with a review
of publicly compiled information on wrongful death cases generally as well as
data from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts. These databases provide both
a general perspective as well as limited information on the small share of police
shootings included in these samples. The final Section of this Part reports on the
publicized settlement or jury award values for police shootings that have received
prominent newspaper coverage.
A.

OverallStatistics ofPayouts After Wrongful Deaths

Compensation amounts in wrongful death cases consist of a variety of comof the
ponents based on the loss suffered by the survivors. A chief component
32
present
The
income.
lost
the
on
based
is
family
financial loss suffered by the
value of this income loss includes the value of the lost earnings as well as the
324
value of lost fringe benefits. There also are deductions from the consumption
325
share for the deceased so as to identify the net financial loss to the survivors.
Medical costs are in addition to this amount, as is the economic value of lost

320. See id.; QuickFacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/
PST045218 (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9AJ9-NYZF].
321. See WASH. POST Database, supra note 255.
322. See Elliot C. McLaughlin, We're Not Seeing More Police Shootings, Just More News Coverage, CNN
(Apr. 21, 2015, 7:26 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/20/us/police-brutality-video-social-media-attitudes/index.html [https://perma.cc/Z3XU-DF26]; Barber et al., supra note 262, at 924.
323. See Joseph E. Johnson, Economic Valuation for Wrongful Death, 6 CAMPBELL L. REV. 47,49 (1984).
324.

Id. at 56.

325.

Id.
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services. 326 There also may be nonmonetary components, such as the pain and
suffering of the deceased and the loss of consortium. 327
Because the income loss is proportional to the income level of the deceased,
the damages award tends to increase with the pre-death income level of the deceased. 32 Many victims of police shootings may have relatively low income as
they are sometimes unemployed or in low wage jobs. 329 Racial discrimination
that reduces the wage rate of black employees would be an additional contributory factor depressing award amounts for that average victim of police shootings.330 The overall ramification of police shooting victims having low wages is
that the resulting low income levels will tend to depress the damages awards that
they will receive and will consequently send a smaller financial signal to deter
future killings. 33 1
Thomson Reuters collected data on wrongful death verdicts separately for
males, females, and minors from March 2007 to March 2017 in their Personal
Injury Valuation Handbook as part-of their Jury Verdict Research Series. 332 This
sample provides a perspective on wrongful death awards generally, not simply
those wrongful deaths from police shootings. 333 The data are useful in providing
a reference point for assessing the likely role of wrongful death awards if they
adhered to more general practices. The wrongful death cases represent a random
sample from nationwide verdicts over the ten-year time period.334 The values
reported are only from original compensatory jury verdicts for claims from individual plaintiffs of physical, mental, or emotional injury or trauma. 335 These jury
verdicts do not include settlements, defense verdicts, or arbitration awards.33 6
Billion-dollar awards are also excluded. 337 The cases were gathered by independ-

326.

Id at 49, 57.

327.

Id at 49.

328.

See id at 62.

329.

Class and Racial Inequalities in Police Killings, PEOPLE'S POL'Y PROJECT (June 23, 2020), https://
[https://perma.cc/

www.peoplespolicyproject.org/2020/06/23/class-and-racial-inequalities-in-police-killings/
9TGF-YBCZ].

330. DARIELY RODRIGUEZ & HOPE KWIATKOWSKI, LAWS.' COMM. FOR C.R. UNDER L., HOW RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND GENDER IMPACT YOUR LIFE'S WORTH: DISCRIMINATION IN CIVIL DAMAGE AWARDS 3 (2018),
https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/LCLife27s-Worth_FINAL.pdf

[https://perma.cc/P5FX-T6NQ].
331. Kim Hayes, How Your Race and Gender Could Impact Your Injury Settlement,

ENJURIS, https://
www.enjuris.com/blog/news/race-gender-injury-settlement/ [https://perma.cc/7V4J-3JCN].
332. See Thomson Reuters, Basic Injury Values for Wrongful Death ofAdult Males, 4 PERSONAL INJURY
VALUATION HANDBOOK 4.10.6-4.20.6 (2017); Thomson Reuters, Basic Injury Values for Wrongful Death of
Adult Females, 4 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK 4.20.6-4.30.6 (2017); Thomson Reuters, Basic Injury Values for Wrongful Death of Minors, 4 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK 4.30.6-4.40.4 (2017).
333.

See generally4 THOMSON REUTERS, PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS (2017).

334. The PersonalInjury Valuation Handbookstates, "The cases are collected in an impartial manner, with
an equal emphasis on the collection of plaintiff and defense verdicts and with no intentional bias towards extreme
verdicts or geographic regions." Id

335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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ent contractors and furnished by court clerks, legal reporters, attorneys, and media sources.3 38 The results were published in the Personal Injury Valuation
Handbook.339 Thomson Reuters does not provide information on plaintiff or decedent race. 340
TABLE 2.

JURY AWARDS

AND SETTLEMENTS FOR CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL DEATH
FROM THOMSON REUTERS
Minors
Minor
Minor
Adult
Adult
Overall
Females
Males
Females
Males

A. Jury Awards ($)
Median
Mean
Awards of $1,000,000+

969,457
2,578,526
50%

845,994
3,203,989
46%

830,250
2,114,800
44%

1,297,826
3,862,696
62%

1,000,000
2,761,522
51%

B. Settlement Process ($)
Settlement Amount - Median
Settlement Amount - Mean
Final Demand - Median
Final Offer - Median

285,000
841,995
1,000,000
212,500

240,000
686,804
1,500,000
100,000

350,000
1,166,938
325,000
250,000

293,750
811,637
7,000,000
250,000

333,113
1,036,489
1,500,000
250,000

Notes: This table comes from data in the Thomson Reuters PersonalInjury Valuation Handbook. The data
span from March 2007 to March 2017 and exclude arbitration awards, defense verdicts and billion-dollar
verdicts. Panel A contains original compensatory jury awards rendered to individual plaintiffs for claims
of wrongful deaths, and Panel B contains settlement amounts over the same time period for claims of
wrongful death. Thomson Reuters notes that "the availability of settlement data is limited and should be
interpreted accordingly."

The first two rows of Table 2 contain mean and median jury awards for
wrongful death claims from individual plaintiffs over this ten-year period, excluding cases with no awards. 341 Table 2 also provides data on the percentage of
awards greater than one million dollars, and on median final offers and demands
342
The
during settlement negotiation in cases where this information is available.
adult
for
award
median
the
while
$969,457,
was
men
median award for adult
women was $845,994. Throughout most summary statistics provided by Thomson Reuters, wrongful deaths to adult males tend to pay slightly more than
wrongful deaths to adult females. 34 3 The median jury award for wrongful deaths
of minors is $1,000,000-slightly higher than that of adult males. 44 Broken
down by sex, wrongful deaths to minor females receive larger awards than cases
with wrongful deaths to minor males. 345 As is common in award payment
amounts, the mean award for each group is higher than the median award due to
346
large awards that raise the mean value.

338.
339.
340.

Id.
Id.
Id.

341. See supra Table 2.
342. See supra Table 2. Thomson Reuters does not report the percentage of cases with information on settlement negotiations in their wrongful death jury verdict sample.
343. See supra Table 2.
344. See supra Table 2.
345. See supra Table 2.
346. See supra Table 2.
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In addition to jury verdict awards, Thomson Reuters also provides statistics
on settlement awards for wrongful death claims. 347 Panel B of Table 2 reports
the median and mean settlement amounts for wrongful death claims in their sample. 348 The median settlement award for wrongful death claims of adult men is
$285,000, and $240,000 for adult women. 349 Minors have higher settlement
amounts, and, as with the jury verdicts, mean settlement amounts are much
higher than median settlement amounts across all groups. 350
The statistics from Table 2 show that if a relatively average wrongful death
claim wins a payout in court, then the payout will be around $1 million.3 51
Wrongful death claims and their payouts, however, vary greatly in terms of liability types. Table 3 draws on data from the Thomson Reuters PersonalInjury
ValuationHandbook and breaks down the frequency and payout amounts of different wrongful death claims by liability type. 2 Medical malpractice cases were
the most common over this ten-year period, making up 27% of wrongful death
claims for adult males and 44% for adult females. 35 The median award was
largest for both sexes in wrongful death cases for product liability, with wrongful
death claims for males receiving median awards of $1.8 million, while claims for
females received $1.9 million. 3 4
Thomson Reuters reports that cases of police negligence make up 4% of
their male wrongful death sample, where this share includes only claims which
received compensatory jury verdict awards.35 5 The median award for these police negligence cases is $787,500, which is below the median jury verdict award
for all wrongful death cases for males in Table 2.356 Note that these are cases in
which there were jury verdicts for the plaintiffs, which is a difficult challenge
given the legal obstacles to making such claims. 35 7
When considering wrongful death claims that ended in settlements, Table
3 reports the settlements by liability type. Once again, the most frequent settlement type is medical malpractice cases, with medical malpractice representing
20% of all settlements for wrongful deaths to males and 32% for wrongful death
claims for females. 358

347. Thomson Reuters does not report the number of settled cases these statistics represent. They provide
the following disclaimer, "Please note that due to the confidentiality and privacy requirements of most settlement
agreements, the availability of settlement data is limited and should be interpreted accordingly." Thomson Reuters, supra note 333.
348. See supra Table 2.
349. See supra Table 2.
350. See supra Table 2.
351. See supra Table 2.
352. See infra Table 3.
353. See infra Table 3.
354. See infra Table 3.
355. See infra Table 3.
356. Compare supra Table 2, with infra Table 3.
357. See Taylor Dolven, Shot by Cops, Smeared in Court, VICE NEWS (Oct. 30, 2017), https://
news.vice.com/enus/article/pazq57/police-shootings-rule-609 [https://perma.cc/QV4Q-BKLR].
358. See infra Table 3.
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Police negligence claims also result in settlement and represent 6% of all
359
The median settlement
settled wrongful death claims in this ten-year sample.
amount for wrongful death in these cases of police negligence is $650,000, well
above the median settlement amount for males across all types of liability, but
below the median jury verdict award in cases of police negligence, $787,500.360
B.

The Civil Justice Survey ofState Courts Data

Another source of data on wrongful death claims and payouts is the Civil
36
Justice Survey of State Courts ("CJSSC"). 1 The CJSSC collects data on civil
dispositions at the trial court level that conclude in a given year in large U.S.
counties.3 62 While the 2001 iteration sampled from cases in the seventy-five largest U.S. counties, the 2005 iteration sampled from 160 courts in 156 counties and
363
was not restricted to the largest U.S. counties.
Out of 16,910 civil cases across the 2001 and 2005 CJSSC datasets, 700,
364
Of these 700
or 4%, have claims of wrongful death from all types of cases.
and
damages,
compensatory
any
wrongful death claims, 247, or 35%, received
365
wrongCJSSC
2005
and
2001
the
Among
only 16 received punitive damages.
ful death cases with any compensatory award, the median award was
$1,000,000.366

359.
360.
361.

See infra Table 3.
See infra Table 3.
Civil Justice Survey Data, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/Services-and-Ex-

perts/Areas-of-expertise/Civil-justice/Civil-Justice-Survey/Civil-Justice-Survey-Data.aspx

(last visited Mar. 17,

2021) [https://perma.cc/9FG6-DTYY].
362. Id.
363. Id
364. See Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K. Smith, BJS Report: Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, 2001, in CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 2001 (2001).
365. See infra Table 4.
366. See infra Table 4.
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TABLE 3. JURY AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS FOR CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL DEATH BY
LIABILITY TYPE
Jury Awards
Males
Frequency

Settlements
Females

Median
Award

Males

Median
Frequency

Award

F rules
Median
Award

Fretuency

Median
Award

Frequency

Medical
Malpractice
Business
Negligence
Products

27%

770,074

44%-

909,500

20%

400,000

32%

300,000

22%

lIability

15%

1,076,042

19%

609,028

20%

250,000

26%

150,000

1,799,398

6%

1,900,000

7%

114,050

5%

1,705,625

3%

1,350,000

5%

941,524

4%

1,100,000

5%

490,000.

8%

2$5,000

4%

787,500

6%

650,000

4%

862,500

9%

100,000

7%

265;000

3%

698,374

6%

450,000

4%

500,000

3%

136,479

3%

201,250

3%'

135,000

2%

1,500,000

2%

94,339

5%

1005000

6%

113,750

3%

485,725

2%

270,000

Truck
Acciders

Cycle
and.
Vehicle

Collisions
Police
NegUglnce.
Vehicular
Pedestrian
Suits
Govenmuent
Negligence
Premises
Liability

Personal
Negligence
Vehicular

Passenger
Suits

5/

503,948

Head-cn
Colislons

lntersecfion
Colisious

Other
Vehicular
Slits
Other NonVehicular
Suits

7%

756,000

11%

'750,000

6%

199,993

13%

217,500

1%

100000

12%

856,739

2%

325,000

4%

240.000

Notes: The left half of Table 3 contains original compensatory jury awards rendered to individual plaintiffs
for claims of wrongful deaths broken down by the most frequently reported liability cases. Data come
from the Thomson Reuters Personal Injury Valuation Handbook. The data span from March 2007 to

March 2017 and exclude arbitration awards, defense verdicts and billion-dollar verdicts. The right half of
the table contains data on settlement amounts by liability type over the same time period. Thomson Reuters
notes that "the availability of settlement data is limited and should be interpreted accordingly." Percentages may not add to 100% due to rounding.
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TABLE 4. WRONGFUL DEATH JURY AWARDS IN THE 2001 & 2005 CJSSC

With Law

Enforcement

Enforcement

Defendants

Defendants
1,056,000
1,826,657
7

2,243,657
5,993,976
16

-

1,000,000
3,644,428
240

-

Compensatory Jury Award ($ >0)
Median
Mean
Sample Size
Punitive Damages ($ > 0)
Median
Mean
Sample Size
Fees and Costs Awarded ($> 0)
Median
Mean
Sample Size
Final Award Post-Reductions ($> 0)
Median
Mean
Sample Size

Without Law

0

8,215
32,409
65

8,478
8,478

1,000,000
3,829,408
240

800,000
1,702,873
7

1

Notes: Wrongful death jury award data come from the 2001 and 2005 iterations of the Civil Justice
Survey of State Courts. Only non-zero awards are reported above.

The CJSSC records the identity types of plaintiffs and defendants, and allows for searching through wrongful death claims where a named defendant is
identified as law enforcement. 367 Table 4 presents case details for such cases in
the 2001 and 2005 CJSSC data. 368 Only fifteen wrongful death claims where a
defendant is law enforcement exist in the 2001 or 2005 CJSSC datasets, and
seven of these cases resulted in any compensatory damages, a percentage slightly
higher than the rate of receiving a compensatory award for wrongful deaths with
any defendant. 369 The median award in these seven cases was $1,056,000, showing that, conditional on winning at trial, cases of wrongful death at the hands of
law enforcement officers tend to pay out awards with a median level that is sim370
However, the much
ilar in magnitude to cases of wrongful death in general.
lower mean compensatory jury verdict suggests that wrongful death claims
against law enforcement that do receive an award are less likely to receive large
compensatory jury awards, relative to wrongful death claims with non-law enforcement defendants. 37 1 Few cases in this dataset have minor awards for fees,
or award reductions from judges, and none of these cases for wrongful death
372
claims with law enforcement defendants have punitive damages.

367. Data Collection: Civil Justice Survey of State Courts (CJSSC), BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., https://
www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=242 (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/7EUA-L2AY].
368. See supra Table 4.
369. See supra Table 4.
370. See supra Table 4.
371. See supra Table 4.
372. See supra Table 4.
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Wrongful Death Payouts in Police Shootings with ProminentMedia
Coverage

Egregious cases of police use of force garner national attention, but it is
still rare for families of the decedents to receive payouts. 3 73 When cities do pay
families of victims of police shootings, either through settlement or jury awards,
there is often a great amount of media coverage. 37 The payouts, and the series
of appeals that inevitably follow, become news-worthy by themselves. 375
Tables 5, 6, and 7 summarize and document sixty-three such cases of fatal
police shootings that resulted in a payout over 1999-2017 and which received
prominent media coverage. 376 The median award in such high-profile cases is
$1.425 million-just under the amount that Michael Brown's family received in
a settlement after massive media coverage surrounding his fatal police shooting
in Ferguson, Missouri. 377 However, the range is quite large, spanning from $4the compensatory jury award to Gregory Hill's family before the reduction to
$0 378 -to $20 million- the settlement amount between the city of Minneapolis
and the family of Justine Damond. 379 The median jury verdict from this sample
of high-profile jury verdicts is $1,050,000, only $6,000 below the median jury
verdict from the CJSSC data for successful wrongful death claims against law
enforcement defendants, $1,056,000, seen in Table 4.380 The median settlement
of these shootings with prominent media coverage, $1,500,000, is higher than
the median wrongful death award from general police negligence seen in Table
3, $650,000.381 We will show in Part VI that even this amount for high-profile
shootings is still too low to promote effective deterrence of the risks of death
from police shootings.

373.
374.

See infra Tables 6-7.
Williams & Smith, supra note 3.

375. Id.
376. See, e.g., id.; Steven Rich, Derek Hawkins & Scott Higham, FatalShootings by Police Lead to a Wide
Range of Settlements for Families, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/investigations/police-shootings-civil-suits/ [https://perma.cc/T4AT-2YQ9]; Ryllie Danylko, Tamir Rice Settlement: How Cleveland's $6 Million Payout Compares with Similar Cases in US, CLEVELAND.COM (May 19,
2019),
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2016/04/how_thetamirricesettlement.html
[https://perma.cc/
WHG8-GTK8].
377. See Williams & Smith, supra note 3.
378. See Stevens, supranote 73.
379. See Mannix, supranote 29.
380. See supra Table 4.
381. See supra Table 3.
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TABLE 5. WRONGFUL DEATH PAYOUTS IN PROMINENT FATAL
POLICE SHOOTINGS
Median Award

Minimum Award

Maximum

Sample

All Cases

$1,425,000

$4

$20,000,000

63

Jury Verdicts
Settlements

$1,050,000
$1,500,000

$4
$7,500

$3,700,000
$20,000,000

9
54

Male
Female

$1,325,000
$2,000,000

$4
$300,000

$6,500,000
$20,000,000

53
10

Black
Non-Black

$1,500,000
$1,100,000

$4
$20,000

$18,000,000
$20,000,000

46
17

Notes: This non-random sample of fatal police shootings that resulted in a jury award or settlement was compiled from the prominent cases found in Tables 6 and 7. All jury awards refer to
the nominal value of original compensatory jury verdicts before award reductions. The names of
the victims and details of the shooting, including the payouts, are listed in Tables 6 and 7.
Sources are found in the appendix.

Only one of these nine high-profile shootings with a trial that received com382
That was for the 2000
pensatory awards also distributed punitive damages.
shooting of Malcolm Ferguson, whose family received $3.5 million in compensatory damages and $7 million in punitive damages for a New York Police De3
partment's drug bust gone wrong,3 though these awards were later reduced. 84
While most of the victims of these prominent police shootings are male, when
the victim is female, payouts can be much higher. Families of Malissa Williams
385
and Tarika Wilson respectively settled for $1.5 million and $2.5 million -in
386
line with other prominent payouts -while families of Bettie Jones, LaTanya
Haggerty, and Justine Damond settled for $16 million, $18 million, and $20 million respectively. 387 Finally, black victims in this sample have a higher median
award than nonblack victims. 388 The difference in median awards may be due to
greater media coverage of high payouts to black victims, leading to inclusion in
this sample. 389 Still, the median award to any group of victims in this sample is
too low to promote effective deterrence, as we discuss in Part VI.

382.
383.

Ferguson v. City of New York, 901 N.Y.S.2d 609, 611 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
See id.; Ferguson v City of New York $10.5 Million Verdict, BURNS & HARIuS, https://burnshar-

ris.com/verdicts-and-settlements/ferguson-v-city-of-new-york/

(last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/

8R88-P6VW]; Andy Newman, Drug Officer Kills Suspect in a Struggle, N.Y. TIas (Mar. 2, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.rom/2000/03/02/nyregion/drug-officer-kills-suspect-in-a-struggle.html

cc/YRJ6-NETT].
384. See Ferguson, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 612.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Danylko, supra note 376.
See supraTable 5.
See Williams & Smith, supra note 3; infra Table 6; Mannix, supra note 29.
See supraTable 5.

389.

See id.

[https:/perma.
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Another source for payouts following prominent fatal police shootings is
the Chicago Law Department's release of all city payouts from police misconduct from 2011 onwards. 390 Most of these shootings occurred when the police
officers were off duty. 391 Among fatal police shootings, thirty-one cases resulted
in settlements or ury verdicts for the victim's estate, totaling $54,287,712 paid
out since 2011.39 These range from a $5,000 settlement to the estate of Claude
Ellis Jr. after police officers allegedly entered his house without a warrant, beat
him, and then shot him in the chest, 393 to an $8.5 million jury verdict for the
death of Aaron Harrison, who was shot in the back while unarmed according to
eyewitnesses. 394 The average payout from a fatal police shooting in this Chicago
database is over $1.7 million, while the median payout is $1 million. 395
Only thirteen of these thirty-one shootings are classified as at the hands of
an on-duty officer. 396 Focusing on on-duty officers is a data restriction also used
by The Washington Post in creating their database of fatal police shootings. 397
When limited to payouts since 2011 from on-duty police in Chicago following
fatal shootings, the average award is just over $950,000, while the median award
drops to $350,000.398 Payouts after fatal shootings by police in Chicago are similar, if not lower, than payouts nationwide as seen in other datasets. 3 9 A likely
reason why the payment amounts in the Chicago police shootings are lower is
that the Chicago database on fatal police shootings is a comprehensive listing
that includes all settlements and court verdicts. 4 In contrast, the awards for
shootings that received prominent media attention may focus on shootings that
are particularly egregious and likely to receive a larger award. 40 1
When families of the victims do win a payout in court, the award is often
reduced, especially in these prominent cases. 40 The largest award of over $38
million to the family of Korryn Gaines-$300,000 of which was for her estatewas reduced to nothing two and a half years after her death when the judge found
390. Jonah Newman, Settling for Misconduct: About This Project, CH. REP., http://projects.chicagoreporter.com/settlements/about.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/WEE5-8FML] [hereinafter
About This Project];Jonah Newman, Chicago Spent More Than $113 Million on PoliceMisconduct Lawsuits in
2018, CH. REP. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/chicago-spent-more-than-113-million-on-po-

lice-misconduct-lawsuits-in-2018/ [https://perma.cc/VE8T-DUMM].
391. Jonah Newman, Settling for Misconduct, CH. REP., http://projects.chicagoreporter.com/settlements/search/cases (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/K3MU-9T93] (filter by choosing "off-duty" in
Officer Details).

392.

Id.

393. Jonah Newman, Settling for Misconduct, Case 12-CV-6451, CH. REP., http://projects.chicagoreporter.com/settlements/case/12-cv-6451/ [https://perma.cc/9PX4-J86M] (last accessed Oct. 31, 2020).
394. Steve Schmadeke, Family of Teen Slain by Police Awarded $8.5M, CH. TRIB. (Aug. 19, 2013),

https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-08-19-et-met-million-dollar-police-verdict-20130817story.html [https://perma.cc/X5VF-PKNG].
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

See Newman, supra note 391 (filter by choosing "killed by officer" in Outcome).
Id. (filter by choosing "killed by officer" in Outcome; then choosing "on duty" in Officer Details).
See wASH. POST Database, supra note 255.
See Newman, supra note 391.
See infra Table 7.
See Newman, About This Project,supra note 390.
See infra Table 6.

402.

See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of New York, 901 N.Y.S.2d 609, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).
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that the officer should have been given qualified immunity and thus the civil
rights of Gaines were not violated. 4 3 The compensatory and punitive awards for
the case of Malcolm Ferguson were reduced almost ten years after his fatal shooting. 404 The court found that there was not sufficient proof that Ferguson was
alive long enough to qualify for damages for pain and suffering, reducing the
The court affirmed that the ofcompensatory award from $3 million to zero.
ficer's actions were wanton, reckless, or malicious, but that the $7 million punitive damages award was excessive, and instead reduced that award to $2.7 million. 406
After winning an initial jury verdict of $2.2 million, the family of Mohamed
Bah received $1.9 million seven years after the shooting of Bah, following a
series of appeals.4 07 Following a jury award of just $20,000 for the loss of life of
forty-four-year-old James Ahern, the officer held liable in a civil trial filed for
bankruptcy.4 08 An Arkansas bankruptcy court found the debt dischargeable, and
the family of Ahern received nothing.4 9 After a Florida jury gave $1 to each of
Gregory Hill's three children and $1 for his funeral expenses-for a total compensatory jury verdict of four dollars-the lawyer for the family of Gregory Hill
told reporters he expected that the judge would reduce the nominal award to
nothing. 4 10

Jacobs, supra note 64.
Ferguson, 901 N.Y.S.2d at 611-12.
405. See id. at 611.
406. Id. at 612.
407. Stephen Rex Brown, NYC Agrees to Pay $1.9 Million for NYPD Killing of Mohamed Bah, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Mar. 21, 2019, 6:01 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/ny-mohamed-bah-settlement403.

404.

,

20190321-qw42dtzosvabhpadgsahoayjsu-story.html [https://www.perma.cc/HCD3-TBRW].
9
2
408. See Ahern v. Brackney (In re Brackney), Ch. 7 Case No. 5:12-bk-72111, Adv. No. 5:1 -ap-0710
2013 Bankr. LEXIS 958, at *11 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 14, 2013).
409. Id.
410.

Lockhart, supra note 68.
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TABLE 6: SAMPLE OF 54 SETTLEMENTS FOR PROMINENT FATAL POLICE SHOOTINGS
Name
Justine Damond
LaTanya Raggerty
Bettie Jones
Walter Scott
Danroy Heray Jr.
Tamir Rice
Eric Harris
James Boyd
Laquan McDonald
Kathryn Johnston
Samuel Dubose
Flint Farmer
Ramarley Graham
Esau Castellanos
Sean Bell
John Geer
Amadou Diallo
Philando Castile
Cedrik Chatman
Oscar Grant
Tarika Wilson
Emil Mann
Jonathan Ferrell
Emmanuel Lopez
Jashon Bryant
Timothy Russell
Malissa Williams
Michael Brown
Danielle Willard
Anthony Smith
Paul Childs
Lany Jackson Jr.
Ernest Satterwhite
Yvette Smith
Jason Kemp
Joseph Erin Hamley
Keith Vidal
Ryan Rogers

Dakota Bright
Willie Miller
Niles Meservey
Bernard Bailey
Bobby Stacy
Edward Lamont Hunt
Patricia Ann Cook
Roy Glenn Jr.
Rickey Childs
Warren Robinson
Tatioun Williams
Eric Williams
William Sheffield
Arthur Hutchinson
Angelo Miller
Vincent Smith Jr.

Race
White
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
White
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Hispanic
Black
White
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
Nat Am.
Black
Hispanic

Sex
F
F
F
M
M
M
M

Black
Black
Black
White
Black

M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
F
M

Black

M

Black

M

Black

M

Black
White
White
White
Black
Black
Black
White
Black
White
Black
White
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
White
Black
Black
Black

F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M

Black

M
M
F
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M
M

Date
07/15/2017
06/04/1999

12/26/2015
04/04/2015
10/17/2010
11/23/2014
04/02/2015
03/16/2014
10/20/2014
11/21/2006
07/19/2015
06/07/2011
02/02/2012
03/16/2013
11/25/2006
08/29/2013
02/04/1999
07/06/2016
01/07/2013
01/01/2009
01/04/2008
04/01/2006
09/14/2013
09/16/2005
05/07/2005
11/29/2012
11/29/2012
08/09/2014
11/02/2012
12/20/2011
07/05/2003
07/26/2013
02/09/2014
02/16/2014
07/20/2010
03/07/2006
01/05/2014
03/20/2013
11/08/2012
04/02/2010
06/10/2009
05/02/2011
03/28/2010
01/30/2008
02/09/2012
02/22/2009
10/28/2016
07/05/2014
05/25/2011
04/14/2005
12/29/2005
03/16/2000
03/23/2007
01/15/2006

Location of Shooting
Minneapolis, MN
Chicago, IL
Chicago, IL
North Charleston, SC
Westchester, NY
Cleveland, OH
Tulsa, OK
Albuquerque,NM
Chicago, IL
Atlanta, GA
Cincinnati, OH
Chicago, IL
New York, NY
Chicago, IL
New York, NY
Springfield, VA
New York,NY
Falcon Heights, MN
Chicago, IL
Oakland, CA
Lima,OH
Mahwah,NJ
Charlotte, NC
Chicago, IL
Hartford, CT
Cleveland, OH
Cleveland, OH
Ferguson, MO
West Valley City, UT
St Louis, MO
Denver, CO
Austin, TX
North Augusta, GA
Bastrop County, TX
Grand Junction, CO
Tontitown, AR
Boiling Springs Lake, NC
Chicago, IL
Chicago, IL
Chicago, IL
Everett, WA
Eutawville,

SC

Southwest City, MO
Baltimore, MD
Culpeper, VA
Humboldt, TN
Chicago, IL
Chicago, IL
Chicago, IL
Detroit, MI
Society Hill, SC
Chicago IL
Cleveland, OH
Gary, IN

Payout ($)
20,000,000
18,000,000
16,000,000
6,500,000
6,000,000
6,000,000
6,000,000
5,000,000
5,000,000
4,900,000
4,800,000
4,100,000
3,900,000
3,750,000
3,250,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
2,800,000
2,500,000
2,420,000
2,250,000
2,200,000
1,600,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
1,425,000
1,400,000
1,325,000
1,300,000
1,200,000
1,200,000
1,100,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
1,000,000
925,000
750,000
500,000
400,000
375,000
375,000
300,000
209,000
100,000
100,000
100,000
85,000
75,000
60,000
35,000

7,500

Notes: This non-random sample of fatal police shootings that resulted in a settlement was compiled from
prominent cases, and all cases are sourced in the appendix.
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TABLE 7. SAMPLE OF 9 JURY VERDICTS FOR PROMINENT FATAL
POLICE SHOOTINGS
Name
Prince Jones
Malcolm Ferguson
Mohamed Bah
Alfontish Cockerham
Quintoio Legrier
Zachary Snyder
Koayn Gaies
James Ahem
GregoryHill

Age
25
23
28
23
19
23
26
47
30

Race
Black
Black
Black
Black
Black
White
Black
White
Black

Sex
M
M
M
M
M
M
F
M
M

Date of
Shooting
9/1/2000
3/1/2000
9/25/2012
06/20/2015
12/26/2015
02/14/2008
08/01/2016
01/20/2010
01/14/2014

Location of
Shooting
Fairfax, VA
BronxNY
New York, NY
Chicago, IL
Chicago, IL
Cape Gir., MO
Baltimore, MD
Bella Vis., AK
FortPierce,FL

Original Jury
Verdict ($)
3,700,000
3,500,000
2,200,000
1,180,000
1,050,000
1,000,000
300,000
20,000
4

Payout (S)
3,700,000
500,000
1,900,000
1,180,000
0
1,000,000
0
0
0

Notes: This non-random sample of fatal police shootings that resulted in a jury award was compiled from
prominent cases and are all sourced in the appendix. All jury awards refer to the nominal value of original
compensatory jury verdicts before award reductions.

When Chicago Police Department Officer Robert Rialmo shot and killed
both Bettie Jones, fifty-five, and Quintonio LeGrier, nineteen, on the night of
December 26, 2015, the city settled with the family of Bettie Jones for $16 million, but the case went to trial for the wrongful death claim regarding Quintonio
LeGrier. 4 11 In that case, the jury awarded $1.05 million to the family of LeGrier,
but moments after the award was announced, the judge described a special interrogatory that jurors signed. 4 12 The interrogatory showed that the jury believed
Rialmo had shot LeGrier due to a reasonable belief that LeGrier posed a threat
to the officers the night of the shooting. 4 13 The judge then used the answer to that
4 14
specific question to entirely wipe out the award the jury handed down. During
interviews afterwards, the jury foreman suggested that the jury believed the $1.05
4 15
million award would be imposed.
These outcomes illustrate that among wrongful death claims that receive
payouts, relatively large payouts in jury verdicts, nominal payouts in jury ver4 16
Jury verdicts, and jury verdicts in general are often completely overturned.
dicts-which define settlement expectations-of wrongful death payouts from
fatal police shootings are currently highly variable and unpredictable, weakening
the deterrent effect from them.4 17 This Article proposes strengthening this deterrent effect for fatal police shootings in a manner that will not deter police officers
who operate within their legal capacity.
VI. HOw SHOULD DAMAGES BE SET? WRONGFUL DEATH COMPENSATION
AND THE VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE

The previous Parts summarized the criteria for determining whether police
shootings are justified, the prevalence of these shootings, and the payouts from
wrongful death claims. Here, we recognize the desire to reduce these egregious
411.
412.
413.

See Williams & Smith, supra note 3.
Hinkel, supra note 63.

414.
415.

Id.
Id

416.

See id.

417.

See supra Table 7.

Id

DAMAGES TO DETER POLICE SHOOTINGS

No. 3]

785

fatal police shootings and propose establishing in such cases damages awards in
line with the value of a statistical life ("VSL"). Using the VSL for damages
awards will typically increase the overall amount that a municipality will pay out
following these increasingly common incidents. 418 As we will demonstrate below, however, additional criteria may come into play that limit the circumstances
under which a police officer or the municipality is liable for a damages award.4 19
Finally, we address the effectiveness of deterring police behavior via municipal
liability by reviewing a prior debate on attempts to monetize the cost of police
shootings and discussing how our proposal achieves the goal of deterring unwarranted police shootings. 20
A.

Using the Value of a Statistical Life to Monetize Police Killings

If the objective of the damages award includes deterring future unwarranted
police killings, then the conceptualization of the damages amount is different
than simply providing compensation for the survivors' financial loss. If the harm
is tantamount to a monetary loss, then payment of damages equal to the financial
loss will serve to make the victim "whole" and to deter future injuries. 42 1 If the
harm involves loss of one's life, however, then compensation for the financial
loss associated with the wrongful death will fall short of the amount needed to
establish adequate levels of deterrence. 4 22
A well-established economics literature has developed the approach known
as the VSL for setting the price needed to deter fatality risks.4 23 Consider a hypothetical situation in which there is a 1/10,000 probability of being killed. If a
person is willing to pay $900 to avoid this risk, then the VSL, or the value per
unit risk, is $900/(1/10,000) = $9 million. 424 Viewed somewhat differently, if
there is a group of 10,000 people who each face a fatality risk of 1/10,000, then
there will be one expected death to the group. If each person is willing to pay
$900 to eliminate this risk, then the total amount that could be raised to avoid the
risk would be $900 x 10,000 = $9 million.
While one could ask people how much they would be willing to pay to
avoid fatality risks, a more reliable approach to ascertaining this value is to examine how much people are willing to pay in market contexts to reduce actual
risks that they face. How much is it worth spending to obtain a safer car or to live
in a safer neighborhood? Similarly, one could examine how much people require
in compensation to incur risks, such as the amount that workers require to incur

420.

See supra Table 4.
See infra Section VI.C.
See infra Section VI.C.

421.

See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 177-182 (2004).

418.

419.

422. w. Kip Viscusi, Identifying the Legitimate Role ofthe Value of a Statistical Life in Legal Contexts, 25
J. LEGAL ECON. 5, 6 (2019).
423. For a review of this literature, see W. Kip Viscusi, The Value ofIndividual and Societal Risks to Life
and Health, in HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 385 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip
Viscusi eds., 2014); VIsCUSI, supra note 4.
424. This calculation follows that in VISCUSI, supra note 4, at 29-30.
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the risks they face on the job. Because of the substantial availability of employment data and occupational fatality data, a large literature has documented the
VSL amounts implied by how much extra pay workers require to work on dangerous jobs.425 The average VSL found in these studies is about $10 million,
which we will use as our reference point for how much municipalities should be
4 26
penalized per fatality to create optimal levels of deterrence. Similarly, municipalities can use this value in internal analyses to assess which policies to reduce
police shootings based on the costs of these efforts and the monetized value of
the reduction in mortality.
While this proposal to penalize government agencies using the VSL so as
to incentivize their efforts to prevent fatal shootings by police is novel, the idea
of using the VSL to set the price on mortality risks is a well-established governmental practice.4 27 There are more than 100 examples of regulatory impact anal4 28
In
yses by federal agencies that have used the VSL to monetize fatality risks.
4 29
range.
million
recent years, these values have generally been in the $9-$10
For example, in these regulatory analyses, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration used a value of $9.9 million in 2016, the Food and Drug Administration used a value of $10.0 million in 2017, and the Environmental Protection
Agency used a value of $10.9 million in a regulatory analysis in 2018.430 Recent
agency guidance has suggested agency-wide use of a VSL of $9.6 million (in
43
2016 dollars) at the U.S. Department of Transportation, 1 $9.7 million (in 2013
4 32
and $9.6 million (in 2014
dollars) at the Environmental Protection Agency,
433
The general
dollars) at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
magnitude of these figures in current dollars is about $10 million, which this
Article uses as its focal estimate. 434 As applied by federal agencies, these are the
values used to monetize how much it is worth to prevent one expected death that
will occur with some small probability. 435 They are not, for example, measures
of how much a person would need to be compensated to accept the certainty of
death.4 36
A partial listing of labor market studies estimating the VSL appears in W. Kip Viscusi, Best Estimate
Bias in the Value of a Statistical Life, 9 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 205, 206 (2018).
Id. at 227; see also VISCUSI, supra note 4.
Viscusi, supra note 425.
W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Guidepostsfor a Safer Society: Introduction and Overview, 58 J. RISK
UNCERTAINTY 101, 109-11 (2019).
429. Id.
430. Id. at 111-13 (all figures are in 2017 dollars).
&

425.
Selection
426.
427.
428.

431. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., GUIDANCE ON TREATMENT OF THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE
(VSL) IN US DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ANALYSES-2016 ADJUSTMENT (2016), https://www.transpor2

tation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/dos/2016%2Revised%2Value%200fo%2a%2Statistical%2Life% 0Guidance.pdf[https://perma.cc/G2TD-RAAK].
432. OFF. OF POL'Y, U.S. ENv'T. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING MORTALITY RISK REDUCTIONS FOR POLICY: A
META-ANALYTIC APPROACH (2016).
433. OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING & EVALUATION, U.S. DEP'TOF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
GUIDELINES FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2016).
434. See generally VISCUSI, supra note 4.
435. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS

(2003).
436.

Viscusi, supra note 428, at 108.
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How do the awards to victims of police shootings compare to this $10 million figure that is necessary to create efficient levels of deterrence? If these
awards are at a level that is sufficient to set a meaningful price on risks to life,
then they should be in the same range that the federal government applies in
assessing policies to reduce mortality risks. Previous results have indicated, how-

ever, that current payment levels fall considerably short. 437 For the Thomson
Reuters sample in Table 4, the median award for male fatalities involving police
negligence was $787,500, and the median settlement was $650,000.438 The com-

pensatory damages awards in cases with law enforcement defendants in the
CJSSC data in Table 4 had a median value of $1.056 million. 439 The case studies
drawn from the national media that were reported in Tables 6 and 7 are greater,
as one would expect for highly publicized cases, but the payment amounts still
are usually well below the government agencies' VSL.
Three of the cases in
the sample of 44 publicized settled cases in Table 6 had settlement amounts of at
least $10 million." 1 The highest payout in the sample of cases in Table 7 that
went to trial is $3.7 million. 4 2 While there was a jury award of $38.2 million in
one case, the trial judge reduced that award to zero. 3
How great should the payments be? Setting the appropriate damages

amount depends on the objective. If the only purpose is to compensate the decedent's family and not to deter future shootings, then conventional wrongful death
awards are appropriate. In many of the cases discussed above, however, there is

an evident shortfall in the procedures set in place to deter such shootings. Moreover, the nature of the fatality is different than that in other wrongful death situations.44 Most shootings by police are not the result of an unanticipated accident
in which a gun goes off by accident.4 5 Rather, the police officer typically makes

a conscious decision to fire the weapon at the victim.446 In some instances, police
departments have been remiss, such as with respect to inadequate training or failure to enforce requirements that officers have their body cameras turned on in
such situations.

This Article proposes that, in situations in which deterrence of fatal killings
by the police is a prominent concern and in which the objectives include more
than simply compensating the victims, the total damages amount be based on the
VSL. The mechanism for establishing these award amounts for deterrence purposes could be a punitive damages award. While it is unlikely that shootings by

police officers are malicious, shooting someone who does not pose a substantial
physical threat to the police does display a "willful or wanton disregard for the
437. See supra Table 4.
438. See supra Table 3.
439. See supra Table 4.
440. See supra Tables 6-7.
441. See supra Table 6.
442. See supra Table 7.
443. Jacobs, supra note 64.
444. Apuzzo, supra note 212.
445. Id
446. Id.
447. See Kindy, supra note 314.
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rights of others," which also is a representative criterion that can trigger punitive
damages awards.44 8 The sum of the compensatory damages award and the punitive damages award should equal the VSL to set the correct economic price for
449
This approach provides the jury with a sound
deterring shootings by police.

rationale for why they should award punitive damages and how they should set
the level of punitive damages. It consequently also eliminates much of the uncertainty that juries have in mapping their outrage with certain types of behavior
into a dollar penalty amount.45
Juries may, of course, be reluctant to award punitive damages against the
police. 451 For example, there were no punitive damages awards in the CJSSC
data in Table 4.452 However, it is sometimes possible to incorporate the VSL into
compensatory damages amounts. The most common use of this practice is known
as hedonic damages, whereby the VSL is used as a measure of the loss of enjoyment of life by the victim. 4 3 Unfortunately, the VSL is not well-suited to the
task of quantifying the loss of enjoyment of life in wrongful death cases, as it is
a measure of how much should be spent to avert an expected death, not the value
of the loss of enjoyment of life.454 Most state courts now prohibit the application
4 55
of the VSL to monetize the loss of enjoyment of life. That prohibition has a
sound economic basis. These limits, however, pertain to a specific application of

the VSL that is quite different from our proposal, because our proposal is unrelated to valuing the lost enjoyment of life. Unfortunately, the prospects of making
damages awards including the VSL are not bright, as juries are not generally
456
permitted to award compensatory damages for deterrence. Given these limitations, the practical task is for the plaintiff's attorney to motivate the rationale for
punitive damages.

In the absence of the financial pressure exerted by litigation, municipalities
457
nevertheless can undertake initiatives to prevent negligent police shootings.
Such efforts impose costs in that they involve more careful screening of appli458
cants, better police training, and increased monitoring of police behavior. How
448.
449.

Jardel Co. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 528 (Del. 1987).
See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of New York, 901 N.Y.S.2d 609, 609 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010).

450.

CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ET AL., PUNITrVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE 25-26 (2002).

See id. at 25.
See supra Table 4.
VlsCuSI, supra note 4, at 204-210.
Thomas R. Ireland, The Last of Hedonic Damages: Nevada, New Mexico, and Running a Bluff, 16 J.
LEGAL ECON. 91, 95 (2009).
455. Id. at 91; Thomas R. Ireland, Recent Legal Decisions RegardingHedonic Damages: An Update, 13 J.
FORENSIC ECON. 189, 200 (2000); Thomas R. Ireland, Trends in Legal Decisions Involving Hedonic Damages
from 2000 to 2012, 19 J. LEGAL ECON. 61, 63 (2012).
456. See, e.g., Sheila B. Scheuerman & Anthony J. Franze, InstructingJuries on Punitive Damages: Due
Process Revisited After Philip Morris v. Williams, 10 J. CONST. L. 1147, 1179 nn.180-82, 1190 nn.210-1 1 (2008)
(providing jury instructions in many states that demonstrate deterrence damages are appropriate for only punitive
damages); Edith Greene & Brian Bornstein, PreciousLittle Guidance: Jury Instruction on Damage Awards, 6
451.
452.
453.
454.

PSYCH., PUB. POL'Y, & L. 743, 744-45 (2000).

457. Chuck Wexler, What It Will Take to Reduce Deadly Shootings by Police, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2018,
10:36 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/what-it-will-take-to-reduce-deadly-shootings-by-police/2018/01/19/003df822-f65e-I Ie7-a9e3-abI8ce41436astory.html [https://perma.cc/EAD4-2BJR].
458. Id.
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much should the police allocate to these efforts to reduce such shootings? The
pricing using the VSL indicates that this amount should be substantial. If the
municipalities undertook a benefit-cost approach, then there would be a justification for large investments to reduce the current number of police shootings
resulting in fatalities.
TABLE 8. MONETIZED VALUE OF FATALITIES FROM POLICE SHOOTINGS
Shooting
Mortality Cost of Shootings ($ billions)
Category of Victim
Deaths
2015-2018 Period
Annual Costs
2015-2018
Unarmed and Fleeing
114
1.14
0.285
Unarmed and Not Fleeing
141
1.41
0.353
Armed and Fleeing
955
9.55
2.388
Armed and Not Fleeing
2,356
23.56
5.890
Armed or Fleeing Status Not Reported
368
3.68
0.920
All deaths
3,934
39.34
9.835
Notes: Mortality costs are calculated by applying a $10 million estimate for the value of a statistical
life to records in the fatal police shooting database of The Washington Post in Table 1.

B.

The Aggregate Cost of Police Shootings

To appreciate the magnitude of the stakes, consider Table 8, which applies
the VSL to the number of deaths resulting from police shootings in the 20152018 period in Table 1. 459 There are 114 deaths to those who are unarmed and
fleeing, which when valued at $10 million per fatality has a total mortality risk
value of $1.14 billion.4 60 If the loss of the 141 unarmed and not fleeing individuals is added to this amount, then there is an additional $1.41 billion mortality
cost, leading to a total value of the 255 deaths in the first two rows of Table 8 of
$2.55 billion. 4 61 If it is also desirable to prevent the killing of the 955 armed and
fleeing victims, then there is an additional $9.55 billion mortality cost.4 62 The
total number of deaths in three rows of Table 8 rises to 1,210, with an economic
value of $12.1 billion. 4 63 Prevention of all 3,934 deaths included in Table 1 has
a value of $39.34 billion.4 64 Even based on annualized version of these calculations, the level of the mortality costs is substantial, ranging from $285 million to
$9.8 billion. 4 65 From a fiscal standpoint, allocating funds to avert fatalities from
police shootings should be a prominent policy concern.
Should the municipality not undertake such a benefit-cost approach, it
would nevertheless be possible for juries to assess whether governmental agencies have been negligent. The VSL serves as a reference point for how much

459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.

See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 8.
See supra Table 1.
See supra Table 8.
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466
should be spent per expected death averted. Suppose that over the past decade
the municipality has had eight police shootings in the categories for which the
shootings appear to have been unwarranted. Over that time period, the city
should have been willing to spend $80 million or $8 million per year on efforts
to avert these shootings based on a standard benefit-cost test. 67 Examination of
these expenditures in relationship to the VSL consequently provides additional
guidance with respect to whether the public institutions have also been remiss,
not simply the police officers involved.

C.

Achieving Deterrence Through Making Government Pay

Proposals to incentive municipalities are not new, although this Article's
proposed usage of the VSL to monetize the deaths is novel. The literature to date
has included both advocates and opponents of attempting to incentivize governments. 468 Two concerns arise with the proposed solution of deterring police
shootings through larger damages awards to a municipality: the failure of police
officers to be incentivized by municipal payments and the failure of government
agencies to respond to financial incentives.
These two concerns are central to Professor Daryl Levinson's argument
7
against the effectiveness of "Making Government Pay' 0 for constitutional tort
remedies. The first concern is that police officers may not internalize the costs
that the cause which the municipality ultimately pays for via a damages
award. 4 1When a municipality pays a victim's family for a police shooting, the
police officer may face sanctions such as a suspension, negative publicity, or
additional oversight. 472 In most cases, police officers do not face direct monetary
penalties for their fatal shootings.473 Since they are the ones pulling the trigger,
police officers may not change their behavior since they do not realize the cost
474
nor would they internalize higher court-awarded damages. One might encounter similar claims that employees at large private organizations will not be incentivized by punitive damages against the firm or, for that matter, by any financial
47
incentive affecting the firm. However, efficiently run firms will establish administrative structures to foster the institution's overall objectives, as would ef476
ficiently run government organizations.

466.

vIscUsI, supra note 4, at 216. This proposed test is analogous to the risk-utility test for products. See
§ 2(b) (AM. L. INST. 2012).

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
467. See VIScusI, supra note 4.

468. See, e.g., id
469. Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional
Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345, 347 (2000).
470. See id
471. See, e.g., id. at 351.
472. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 885 (2014).
473. See id. at 890 (revealing that individual officers contributed just 0.02% of the $730 million in settlements and judgments in her five-year study of forty-four large jurisdictions).
474. See Levison supra note 469, at 352.
475. See id at 345-46.
476. See id. at 348.
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The second concern is an extension of the first: even if the behavior of police officers could be influenced by municipalities, monetary damages may not
influence a government in the same way they would influence a private firm or
individual.4' 7 Professor Levinson acknowledges that governments have budgets
and that managers prefer to avoid damages payments, but he emphasizes that
government actors respond to political incentives rather than market incentives. 478 It is likely, however, that financial penalties on municipalities will lead
to either higher taxes or budgetary cutbacks, either of which will impinge on the
political incentives. 479 Levinson further questions creating mechanisms for optimal deterrence in the field of constitutional tort litigation due to the difficulty to
quantify costs and benefits that arise from police use of force. 48 0 Our Article
addresses the task of quantifying the benefits of reduced force by monetizing the
reduced fatalities using the VSL. 48 1
The debate over the indirect deterrent effect continues with the response of
Professor Gilles to Professor Levinson. 4 82 She addresses his critiques, finding
that municipal liability claims specifically target political objectives, rather than
solely economic objectives.4 83 Holding municipalities liable through Monell
achieves political goals that produce deterrence. 4 Since Monell requires a policy or custom of the municipality to lead to the constitutional injury before the
municipality is held liable, claims against municipalities allow for the discovery
of systemic faults that can be corrected. 485 Monell claims draw out information
regarding "deliberate indifference to police brutality . .. 'repeater' officers ...
and the attitudes of police officials towards important police disciplinary issues."486 Bringing these systemic issues to light has been a goal not just of litigators but also of the general public. 487 Several cities have created independent
police oversight committees in response to police misconduct, especially fatal
police shootings. 488 Multiple independent databases have been created to track
fatal police shootings, and police officer convictions. 489 All of these responses
draw publicity, attention, and oversight that are largely unwanted by police departments.490

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.
482.

See id. at 349.
See id at 357.
See Schwartz, supra note 472, at 898.
See Levinson, supra note 469, at 367-73.
See supra Part IV.
Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense ofMaking Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort

Remedies, 35 GA. L. REv. 845, 848 (2000).
483. Id at 849.
484.
485.
486.

See id at 863.
See id.
G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator's view of Discovery and Proof in Police Misconduct Policy and Practice

Cases, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 747, 748-49 (1999).
487. See id at 772.
488. See Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 841, 849-52 (describing the changes that five large police jurisdictions took following lawsuits).
489. See, e.g., WASH. POST Database, supra note 255; Stinson, supra note 59.
490. See Gilles, supra note 482, at 860.
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Municipalities will change their policies and customs following intense lit49 1
igation surrounding constitutional tort claims under Monell. How will this impact on policymakers change the behavior of street-level officers causing the
constitutional tort claims and public outcry in the first place? If municipalities
are in fact experiencing negative political outcomes through Monell or through
higher damages, then the municipalities will be incentivized to reduce the police
4 92
Higher damages will incentivize the
conduct that leads to these outcomes.
most effective reforms on police use of force; one possible reform is smarter
training on use of force. 4 93
Additional police training in this area has actually improved police interactions with citizens. One bright-line rule, established in 1972 in New York City,
prohibited the New York Police Department from the application of deadly force
against people in a moving vehicle-unless the occupants were using deadly
force other than the vehicle. 494 This rule resulted in an immediate and dramatic
4 95
Police departreduction in police shootings, without harms to officer safety.
ments of Boston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Denver, Philadelphia, and D.C. have all
4 96
enacted a similar policy.
Beyond bright-line rules against use of force, other methods of police reform have been effective.4 97 Chuck Wexler, the executive director of the Police
Executive Research Forum, cites success in the city of Camden, New Jersey,
when the police chief initiated reforms that aim to emphasize the "sanctity of
life."498 In 2013, the Camden Police Department was disbanded, and reimagined
over the next few years, with fewer officers, lower pay, and a focus on community policing. 499 After an incident in 2015 when a man entered a fast-food restaurant and threatened employees with a knife, the police, who were recorded on
50
video,500 secured nearby areas and apprehended the man without injury. 1
Speaking to the impact of the new reform, the police chief said, "Six months ago,
we would have shot that individual." 502 This story is indicative of the overall
effect of the reform. Wexler cites statistics that show that complaints alleging

491. See id.
492. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L.
REV. 1144,1148-49 (2016) (describing that this effect would be stronger for smaller police departments and ones
that rely on insurance outside of the city).

493.

Id. at 1195.

494.

POLICE EXEC. RSCH. F., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON USE OF FORCE 44,

495.

Id. at 118.

118

(2016).

496. Id at 44.
497. Chuck Wexler, What It Will Take to Reduce Deadly Shootings by Police, WASH. POST, (Jan. 19, 2018,
10:36 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/what-it-will-take-to-reduce-deadly-shootings-by-police/

2018/01/19/003df822-f65e-1 1e7-a9e3-abl8ce41436astory.html [https://perma.cc/EAD4-2BJR].
498. Id.
499. Sarah Holder, What Happened to Crime in Camden?, CITYLAB, (Jan. 10, 2018, 6:18 AM), https://
www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/what-happened-to-crime-in-camden/549542/ [https://penna.cc/572P-4KW2].
500. Video of the incident is available on YouTube at Broadway & Mickle Man with a Knife Incident,
YOuTUBE (Nov. 24. 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?timecontinue=4&v=YtVUMT9P8iw [https://

perma.cc/VAC4-2XDK].
501. Id
502.

Wexler, supra note 497.
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excessive force by police dropped from sixty-five in 2014 to fourteen in 2017.503
Different methods of training could work better for separate police departments,
but higher damages awards for fatal police shootings would incentivize each municipality to better deter fatal shootings in the manner most effective for that
police department. 504

One final potential concern is that these damages awards would over-deter
proper police responses to crime.505 The data in Table 1 from The Washington

Posthighlight that most fatal police shootings occur when victims are armed with
a gun or attacking. 506 Judges typically find that any constitutional rights violation
in such a case falls under qualified immunity for the officer, and indeed these
types of shootings rarely receive payouts of any kind. 507 Because of the quali-

fied immunity doctrine, police need not worry that their actions in these cases
will be deterred. 508 Qualified immunity is granted by courts when judges see police behavior, despite unconstitutionality, as "'objectively reasonable' in light of
the totality of the circumstances."5 09 This status is granted often, too. A study of
all federal court cases in a two-year period found that 80% of qualified immunity
claims were granted. 510 This Article's proposed deterrence effect of raising damages awards is for fatal police shootings that are so egregious that they result in
a payout in the first place. We are not concerned with over-deterring the police
shootings that courts already find to be "over-the-line" via damages awards. The
police shootings that courts typically grant qualified immunity to will continue
to be granted qualified immunity, resulting in no such over-deterrence effect on
police behavior of which courts already approve.
VII.

FIXING THE SYSTEM: BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF POLICE TACTICS AND

USE OF FORCE

Police tactics such as use of force should, like any other action, satisfy a
properly conducted benefit-cost analysis. There are many broad benefits to policing, most notably safety, which is a valuable goal of any community. 511 The
costs of policing are many, including the monetary cost for the officers' labor
and their equipment, as well as the cost when officers coerce or use force on

503.

Id.

504. See Schwartz, supra note 492, at 1195.
505. See Lawrence Rosenthal, Good and Bad Ways to Address Police Violence, 48 URB. LAW. 675, 714
(2016) (discussing the threat of de-policing, or over-deterrence of police responses to crime, when implementing
reforms to prevent police violence).
506. See supra Table 1.
507. See Gilles, supra note 482, at 850-51 (discussing judicial concern of over-deterring vigorous policy
activity and availing themselves of the qualified immunity standard).
508. See id.

509. Id.
510.
511.

See Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost ofQualifed Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REv. 123, 145 n.106 (1999).
Harmon, supra note 250, at 871.
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subjects. 512 When individuals are arrested, injured, frightened, or killed by police, police coercion creates a cost.513 Ideally, police coercion is used only when
the benefits to society outweigh the costs created by the coercion. 514
Many legal scholars see a glaring need to reform police use of force but
differ in how to achieve that.51 One path to reform police behavior centers
around reinforcing the need of police officers to respect and uphold constitutional
restrictions on use of force. 516 The Supreme Court established the bright-line rule
in Garnerv. Tennessee that it is unreasonable to seize a fleeing, unarmed suspect

with deadly force.51 7 Training officers and the public to better understand constitutional limitations on use of force set forth by courts could reduce costly fatal
shootings. 5 18
Another proposed method to reform policing is a more rigorous benefitcost analysis of police tactics. 519 Researchers and policymakers have sought out
economic analyses of policing and crime since at least the late 1960s; empirical
efforts took longer to answer this call.520 A 1999 review of situational crime prevention found only thirteen studies evaluating the effect on crime of an intervention technique, such as increased surveillance or installing silent alarms and additional street lights. 52 1 Yet even these studies had methodological shortcomings
and were difficult to compare to one another. 522
Recently, much more attention has been given to the effectiveness of policing.52 3 The Policing Project at New York University School of Law is a nonprofit institution that partners with communities and police to ensure just and

512. Id at 951.
513. Id at 871.
514. See id.
515. See Rosenthal, supra note 505, at 679 (encouraging "hot-spot" policing tactics, and caps on disciplinary actions when police tell the truth regarding bad conduct); Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem ofPolicing, 110
MICH. L. REv. 761, 792 (2012); Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio's Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and
Police Discretion, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1271, 1279 (1998).
516. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Tom R. Tyler & Aziz Z. Huq, American Policing at a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policiesand the ProceduralJusticeAlternative, 101 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 335, 350 (2011);
Marcus, supra note 201, at 54-55, 57; Maclin, supra note 515, at 1278.

517.

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).

See supranote 516 and sources cited.
See Harmon, supra note 515, at 792.
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 170
(1968); John Roman & Graham Farrell, Cost-BenefitAnalysis for Crime Prevention: Opportunity Costs, Routine
Savings and Crime Externalities, 14 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 53, 54 (2002); Brandon C. Welsh & David P.
Farrington, Valuefor Money? A Review of the Costs and Benefits of SituationalCrime Prevention, 39 BRITISH J.
CRIMINOLOGY 345, 346 (1999); President's Comm'n on Law Enf't & Admin. of Just., The Challenge of Crime
518.
519.
520.

in a Free Society 32 (1967).
521. See welsh & Farrington, supra note 520, at 348-49 tbll.
522. See Roman & Farrell, supra note 520, at 54. For a more recent and rigorous study on the effectiveness
of streetlights on crime, see Aaron Chalfin, Benjamin Hansen, Jason Lerner & Lucie Parker, Reducing Crime
Through EnvironmentalDesign: Evidencefrom a Randomized Experiment ofStreet Lighting in New York City

(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 25798, 2019).
523. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, We Spend $100 Billion on Policing. We Have No Idea What Works, WASH.
POST (Mar. 10, 2017, 1:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/10/we-spend[https://perma.cc/R3UN-SFFR]; Harmon, supra note
100-billion-on-policing-we-have-no-idea-what-works/
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effective policing, often through benefit-cost analyses of policing methods. 524
One such method the Policing Project analyzed was traffic stops in Nashville,
Tennessee. 525 Their report found no effect of traffic stops on short-term crime or
long-term crime. 526 After comparing the lack of benefits on crime prevention
against the certain resource costs to the police department and the social costs to
communities (especially communities of color), the Policing Project recommended reducing traffic stops in favor of more cost-effective policing methods.52 7
For use of force, analyzing the effectiveness of police tactics is an area
where benefit-cost analysis could help. Yet, despite recent interest in benefit-cost
analyses of police use of force, few rigorous studies exist, because quantifying
the costs and benefits is difficult. 528 Using the VSL, we provide an empirically
measured cost-the loss of the victim's life-as just one direct cost of fatal use
of force.
Other studies of police use of force focus on problems of whether reforms
would be incorporated by police departments and whether courts are the best
institutions to create reforms. 529 A 2017 analysis of the use of force policies from
department manuals across the fifty largest police agencies found that, while
nearly half of the departments include police tactics such as de-escalation in their
manuals, few require such tactics before using lethal force.530 Only eight of the
fifty largest police departments have any guidance regarding emotionally disturbed persons. 53 1 Courts and regulatory bodies should incorporate analysis of
whether police tactics leading up to a shooting, for example, are constitutionally
reasonable, and not just whether the decision to shoot at the moment was reasonable. 532 To this end, greater scientific research on the effectiveness of police tactics is needed.
Finally, courts face difficulties in constraining improper police conduct
solely through constitutional methods. 533 There are an array of federal, state, and
local laws that shape police behavior more so than constitutional laws can, and
judges are often unaware of the "institutional structures, occupational norms,

515, at 874; Maria Ponomarenko & Barry Friedman, Benefit-Cost Analysis of Public Safety: Facing the Methodological Challenges, 8 J. BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 305, 306 (2017).
524. Our Mission, NYU SCH. L.: POLICING PROJECT, https://www.policingproject.org/our-mission, (last
visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/6GEM-23C4].
525. See generally Policing Project at N.Y.U., An Assessment of Traffic Stops and Policing Strategies in

Nashville (2018).
526. Id. at 9-10.
527. Id at 3, 11-15.
528. See Harmon, supra note 515, at 793. Footnote 126 describes one study of aggregate costs yet calls for
greater theoretical work on these policies.
529.

U.S. COMM'N ON CIv. RTS., POLICE USE OF FORCE: AN EXAMINATION OF MODERN POLICING

PRACTICES 5 (2018).
530. See Garrett & Stoughton, supra note 167, at 219.

531.

Id. at 283.

532.
533.

Id at 303.
Harmon, supra note 515, at 763.
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market pressures, political influences, and unconstitutional laws" 534 when engaging with legal decisions on police conduct. Nonjudicial institutions often
have greater influence on police conduct than the courts, in part due to Supreme
Court decisions that allow deference to police when questioning their own conduct.5 35 Our proposal of courts allowing punitive damages for unwarranted police shootings is one method where the judiciary can play a greater role than
nonjudicial institutions in creating effective deterrence. Police behavior should
be shaped not only by what is constitutional but by what is effective and costefficient. Better research on the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of policing, as
well as how to enforce such reforms, is necessary to achieve that goal.
VIII. CONCLUSION: TOWARD EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE OF POLICE SHOOTINGS

There are, of course, many situations in which police shootings are warranted.5 36 But too many police shootings are not justified. 537 Fatal use of force
against an unarmed, fleeing suspect is not justified under a constitutional test or
a benefit-cost test.538 Black people are disproportionately victims of all fatal police shootings and comprise an even larger share of victims of unjust fatal police
shootings. 53 For a victim's family to receive any payout from a court, the court
must "slosh" through the "factbound morass" of how reasonable the officer's use
of force was. 540
The "factbound morass" can be vast, but documentation of key factors from
Graham can help.5 41 Basic binary facts pertaining to the shooting-whether the
victim was armed and whether the victim was fleeing-can inform much of the
reasonability analysis. 542 Yet whether or not force is considered reasonable under
543
a constitutional lens, fatal force imposes costs-primarily the victim's life.
These mortality costs on the victims should be treated as being just as consequential as the mortality risks that the government seeks to reduce in regulatory
contexts. Police shootings impose hundreds of millions of dollars in mortality
costs every year even under a very restrictive definition of determining which
police shootings are not consistent with current legal guidelines.544 The broadest
definition of police shootings results in an annual mortality cost to the victims of

Id at 774.
535. Id at 809.
536. See Sarah DeGue, Katherine A. Fowler & Cynthia Calkins, Deaths Due to Use ofLethal Force by Law
Enforcement: Findingsfrom the National Violent Death Reporting System, 17 U S. States, 2009-2012, 51 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. S173, S177 (2016).
537. See id at S 174-74.
538. See supra text accompanying notes 515-28.
539. See DeGue et. al, supra note 536, at 5173, S182 tbl.8.
534.

540.
541.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383 (2007).
See id.; see also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 (1989).

542. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 382-83 (explaining how Garner held unreasonable shooting an unarmed and
fleeing victim).
543. See supra Table 1 (reporting the number of lives lost).
544. See supra Table 8 (monetizing value of fatalities from police shootings by category of victim).
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almost $10 billion. 545 Even limiting the focus to victims who are unarmed and
fleeing leads to an annual mortality costs of $285 million. 54 6
To establish meaningful incentives to deter police shootings, this Article
proposes that there be recognition of the pertinent economic costs imposed by
such killings. Standard wrongful death awards almost invariably fall short of the
requisite economic costs of these deaths. Application of the value of a statistical
life could serve to monetize these costs by providing a framework for setting
punitive damages in situations where such damages are warranted. When court
awards are sufficient, they in effect set the price for expected deaths that municipalities can prevent through more effective screening, training, and monitoring
of the police. If the incentives provided by the legal system fall short, municipalities can nevertheless undertake assessments using the value of a statistical life
to ascertain which policies should be adopted to reduce police killings. Monetizing these expected deaths does not devalue them but rather elevates them to receive the same weight as the government places on other fatality risks.
The media and national protests have rightfully brought attention to the injustice of many fatal police shootings. Many approaches for preventing such
shootings exist. Directly disincentivizing fatal police shootings, and thereby incentivizing the most effective policing reforms, is one method for courts to play
a role in reducing these injustices and promoting effective policing.

545.
546.

See id. (reporting all deaths' annual costs as $9.835 billion).
See id.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1:
SOURCES FOR POLICE SHOOTING VICTIMS IN TABLES 6 & 7

Payout ($)

Name
Settlements
7
Justine Damonds4
LaTanya Haggerty5 48
Bettie Jones 549
Walter Scott 550
55
Danroy Henry Jr. '
55 2
Tamir Rice
Eric Harris553
James Boyd554
555
Laquan McDonald
56
Kathryn Johnston
557
Samuel Dubose
58
Flint FarmerS
5 59
Ramarley Graham
Esau Castellanos560
Sean Bell 5 61
John Geers62

547.

20,000,000
18,000,000
16,000,000
6,500,000
6,000,000

6,000,000
6,000,000
5,000,000
5,000,000
4,900,000
4,850,000
4,100,000
3,900,000
3,750,000
3,250,000
3,000,000

Judge Approves $20MSettlementfor Justine Ruszczyk Damond's Family, CBS MINN. (June 25, 2019,

11:13 AM), https://minnesota.cbslocal.com/2019/06/25/judge-approves-20m-settlement-for-Justine-ruszczykdamonds-family/ [https://perma.cc/EEP7-WK7T].
548.

Williams & Smith, supra note 3.

549.
550.

Id.
Id.

551.

Danylko, supra note 376.

552.

Id.

553. Corey Jones, Tulsa County Settles Eric Harris Excessive Force Lawsuit for $6 Million Days After
Robert Bates Renews Appeal, TULsA WORLD (Mar. 9, 2018), https://tulsaworld.com/news/oca/crime-and-

courts/tulsa-county-settles-eric-hams-excessive-force-lawsuit-for-6-million-days-after-robert-bates/article_3305adab-79c2-5fa9-8003-73207eb82424.html [https://perma.cc/E92V-AX54].
554. Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supra note 376.
555. Williams & Smith, supra note 3.
556. Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supra note 376.
557. Sheryl Gay Stolherg, University ofCincinnati to Pay $4.85 Million to Family ofMan Killed by Officer,
85
-miN.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/us/university-of-cincinnati-to-pay-4-

lion-to-family-of-man-killed-by-officer.html [https://perma.cc/M328-REKC].
558. Stacy St. Clair & Jeremy Gomer, Chicago Set to Pay $4.1 Million in Police Shooting, CHI. TRm. (Feb.
9, 2013), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2013-02-09-ct-met-chicago-cop-settlement-20130209story.html [https://perma.cc/MFQ5-T3C6].
559. Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supra note 376.
560. Ted Cox, $3.75MSettlement Approvedfor Fatal Police Shooting ofEsau Castellanos, DNAINFO (July
19, 2016, 4:06 PM), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20160719/downtown/375m-settlement-approved-for-fa-

tal-police-shooting-of-esau-castellanos

[https://perma.cc/UY8N-UH8C].

561.

Williams & Smith, supra note 3.

562.

Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supra note 376.
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Amadou Diallo56 3
Philando Castile 5"
Cedrik Chatman565
Oscar Grant 66
Tarika Wilson 67
Emil Mann 68
Jonathan Ferrell 569

3,000,000
3,000,000
3,000,000
2,800,000
2,500,000
2,420,000
2,250,000

Emmanuel Lopez 570

2,200,000

571

Jashon Bryant
Timothy Russell 5 72
Malissa Williams 573
Michael Brown5 74
Danielle Willard 575
Anthony Smith 576
Paul Childs57 7
Larry Jackson Jr. 578
Ernest Satterwhite 579
Yvette Smith5 80
Jason Kemp5 81
Joseph Erin Hamley58 2
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1,600,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
1,500,000
1,425,000
1,400,000
1,325,000
1,300,000
1,200,000
1,200,000
1,100,000
1,000,000

563.

Williams & Smith, supra note 3.

564.
565.

Id.
Fran Spielman, $3 Million Settlement to Family of Teen Shot by Chicago Police, CHI. SUN TIMES (Dec.

9, 2016, 5:13 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2016/12/9/18334765/3-million-settlement-to-family-of-teen-

shot-by-chicago-police [https://perna.cc/AEW6-VCC6].
566.
567.
568.

Williams & Smith, supra note 3.
Danylko, supra note 376.
Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supra note 376.

569.

Id

570. Justin Madden, Chicago to Pay $3.2 Million to Settle Two FatalPolice Shooting Cases, Reuters (May
18, 2016, 4:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-police-idUSKCN0Y92XD [https://perma.

cc/VJ4B-R9AW].
571.
572.

Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supra note 376.
Danylko, supra note 376.

573.

Id.

574. Williams & Smith, supra note 3.
575. Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supra note 376.
576. Robert Patrick, After Claims of Withheld Evidence, New $500k Settlementfor Family of Man Killed by
Jason Stockley, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 7 2018), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/after-claims-of-withheld-evidence-new-k-settlement-for-family/article_ba30e41 e-93ec-574d-bc75-04dae

117bea3.html
577.

[https://perma.cc/8C9Q-DXT8].
John Ingold, Childs'Mom Takes the Stand, DENVER POST (June 7, 2005,6:22 AM), https://www.den-

verpost.com/2005/06/07/childs-mom-takes-the-stand/ [https://perma.cc/CK7Y-HUHT].
578. Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supra note 376.
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Id
Id
Id

Id.
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Keith Vidal583
Ryan Rogers 584
Dakota Bright 85
Willie Miller 86
Niles Meservey 58 7
Bernard Bailey5 88
Bobby Stacy589
Edward Lamont Hunt5'
Patricia Ann Cook591
Roy Glenn Jr.592
Rickey Childs 93
Warren Robinson 594
Tatioun Williams5 95
Eric Williams 596
William Sheffield 597
Arthur Hutchinson5 98
Angelo Millers99
Vincent Smith Jr.600
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1,000,000
1,000,000
925,000
750,000
500,000
400,000
375,000
375,000
300,000
209,000

100,000
100,000

100,000
85,000
75,000
60,000
35,000
7,500

F.T. Norton, Civil Lawsuit Settledfor $1 Million in Case of Teen Killed by Police, STAR NEWS ONLINE
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police-shooting-unjustified-20170810-story.html [https://perma.cc/VX49-7KJL].
586. Timothy Mclaughlin, Chicago to Pay $4.75 Million in Police Misconduct Cases, Reuters (Jan. 25,
[https://perma.cc/
2017, 6:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chicago-police-idUSKBN15AOIG
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Rich, Hawkins & Higham, supranote 376.
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593. Case 13-CV-7541, CHI REP.: SETTLING FOR MISCONDUCT, http://projects.chicagoreporter.com/settlements/case/13-cv-7541/ (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/QBX8-SRUC].
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